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DUAL NATIONALITY: WITH PARTICULAR REFER-
ENCE TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE
ITALO-AMERICAN
CLYDE BARONE*
INTRODUCTION
D UAL nationality is a legal status of vital significance to the indi-
vidual and of importance to the State. It is possessed by countless
numbers of individuals, many of whom are unaware of their position
or of important and sometimes drastic, if not tragic, consequences.
That the individual's status as a dual national may have dire conse-
quences is attested to by the numerous pleas of assistance addressed to
the Department of State by those American citizens who have felt the
onus of obligations placed upon them by other countries also claiming
them as nationals. The subject is little understood, and less analyzed,
in the light of those consequences.
This article will examine the status of a typical dual national, the
American citizen of Italian origin. In dealing with this specific type,
the broad aspects of the problems of dual nationality will necessarily
be covered, and, in general, the conclusions arrived at will be applicable
to both. The ultimate aim is to clarify an uncertain status and to rec-
ommend specific action for its amelioration.
In the United States there are approximately four million American
citizens of Italian origin. Of these, two and one half million are native
born, and one and one half million are naturalized. All of them are
potential dual nationals. Many of those native born are unaware of
their possible dual nationality; those naturalized may or may not be.
It is not surprising that this should be the case, for many of them have
no occasion to question their nationality status. They are, and have
always been, subject to American laws, American thinking, American
customs. Italy is, at most, but a sentimental image at the back of
their minds. Few have left the territorial confines of the United States,
and even those that have done so may have been unmolested by the
spectre of dual nationality. It is normal for them to think of them-
selves as Americans, just Americans. Yet, the dual status may be there,
and the great increase in travel abroad by these individuals will only
serve to accentuate its presence.
Essentially, dual nationality is caused by conflicting nationality laws
among States. The most usual Italo-American dual nationality arises
when an individual, at birth, acquires the nationality of the United
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States under its nationality laws based on jus soli, and the nationality
of Italy under its nationality laws, essentially based on blood, or descent
from an Italian father, regardless of the place of birth. Dual nationality
may also arise subsequent to birth by virtue of the refusal of the State
of origin to divest an individual of his nationality when the latter has
been naturalized in the United States. This subsequent naturalization
may occur through direct petition made by the individual himself to
the proper agency, or by derivation, as in the case of a minor child
through his father, or in the case of the married woman through her
husband.
Two important questions arise with respect to the American citi-
zen of Italian origin. First, is he, in all cases, a dual national? Secondly,
if he is, what rights, if any, or duties, if any, does he have towards
Italy; towards the United States? To answer these questions and to
arrive at an evaluation and amelioration of the dual nationality prob-
lem, this article will first deal with the concept of nationality. It will
show how dual nationality is created by the independent and conflicting
municipal legislation of Italy and the United States, and how the same
laws may provide for its extinguishment. Part two will consider the
effects of the possession of nationality, with emphasis on the dual na-
tional. International law and the municipal laws of the United States
and Italy will be examined to show what obligations are owed by the
dual national to the States claiming him, and what rights he may possess,
both domestically and abroad. The concluding part will evaluate the
dual national's status and enumerate the proposals and attempts made
either to prevent dual nationality from coming into existence, or to
provide for its divestiture in the event it is created. There will follow
the efforts undertaken to solve specific problems that arise; and finally,
the author will make recommendations designed to ameliorate the situa-
tion, both with respect to dual nationality in general and the Italo-
American in particular.
I. NATIONALITY AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE ITALO-Am MICAN
Concepts and Bases of Nationality
Nationality always connotes some kind of membership in the society
of a State or nation.' From the standpoint of international law, it has
reference to the position of a natural person permanently attached to
a State, whatever may be his particular rights and duties with regard
to that State. This relation is based upon the allegiance owed by the
natural person to the State. The "tie of allegiance" is a term in general
1. Harvard Research in International Law (hereinafter Harvard Research), Draft Con-
vention on Nationality 21 (1929).
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use to denote the sum of obligations of a natural person to the State
to which he belongs. A Mixed Claims Commission gave the following
definition of nationality:
"A man's nationality is a continuing legal relationship between the sovereign state
on the one hand and the citizen on the other. The fundamental basis of a man's
nationality is his membership of an independent political community. This legal
relationship involves rights and corresponding duties upon both-on the part of the
citizen no less than on the part of the state. If the citizen leaves the territory of
this sovereign state and goes to live in another country, the duties and rights which
his nationality involves do not cease to exist, although such rights and duties may
change in their extent and character."2
Though nationality always connotes some kind of membership in the
society of the State, it has varied significance, depending on the capacity
of the person or body concerned and the purpose for which the concept
is to be used. It may have one meaning for an international tribunal
interpreting a treaty,3 and another for the immigration official apply-
ing the McCarran Act.4 A State Department officer thinks of nationality
in terms of protection and espousal of claims; a judge in a civil law
jurisdiction looks upon it as a possible basis for the application of a
particular law. It has a different connotation with respect to the nature
of its subject, and depending on whether it refers to a natural person,
a juristic person, or a ship, the elements of nationality are more or less
inclusive.
There is a constant interchangeable usage of the terms "national,"
"citizen" and "subject." For this reason it is necessary to point out the
distinctions. The term "citizen," in its general acceptation, is applicable
only to a person who is endowed with full political and civil rights in
the body politic of the State.5 When the word "subject" is used it has,
in international law, the same meaning as "citizen." The latter is ap-
plied to members of a State having a republican form of government;
the former to members of a State with monarchical institutions.0 Thus,
our Italo-American dual national, is a "citizen"' of the United States
and of Italy, now a republic, but was at birth a "subject" of the King-
2. R. J. Lynch Claim, Claims Commission Between Great Britain and Mexico, 25 Am.
J. Int. L. 754, 759-756 (1931).
3. United States (Hilson) v. Germany, United States-German Mlixed Claims Commis-
sion, Apr. 22, 1925, Decisions and Opinions 231, 19 Am. J. Int. L. 810 (1925).
4. 8 US.C.A. § 1101(a)(21) (Supp. 1953), "The term 'national' means a person ox-
ing a permanent allegiance to a state;" 8 U.S.CA. 1101(a) (22) (Supp. 1953), "The term
'national of the United States' means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person
who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United
States."
S. 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 1 (1942).
6. Hershey, The Essentials of International Public Law 236 (1912).
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dom of Italy. Use of the term "national" as a synonym for "subject"
or "citizen," in a broad sense, is of comparatively recent origin. All it
is meant to do is indicate the attachment to a State without unduly em-
phasizing the power of the State on the one hand and the civic rights
of the individual on the other.7
What is the importance of nationality? Inasmuch as States are nor-
mally the only recognized subjects of international law,8 nationality is
the link between individuals and that law. If an individual is wronged
abroad, it is, as a rule, only his home State which has the right to
ask for redress. Conversely, an individual without nationality enjoys
no protection, and if he is aggrieved, no State is competent, under the
existing law of nations, to take his case in hand. Also, in the absence
of moral or contractual restraint, nothing prevents a State from abusing
and maltreating such an individual. It is for these reasons that the
question of nationality assumes great importance in international law.9
Within the State, nationality assumes importance because of the vista
of rights it opens up to its possessor. A national is usually a citizen,
and as such is entitled to exercise a voice in the management of his
government. He may own land, hold public office, receive appointment
as an administrator of an estate, enjoy the privilege of practicing law,
and countless other rights which are not always available to the alien.
In addition, there is the psychological well-being which comes from be-
longing to a recognized political entity in association with other citizens.
Where the national is not a citizen, his rights may be more limited,
but they are still greater than the alien's.
Nationality may be acquired at birth or by naturalization. The for-
mer may result from birth in the territory of the State, jure soli, or from
birth outside of the State territory to parents who are nationals, referred
to as nationality by blood, or jure sanguinis. International law has long
recognized both systems as legitimate grounds for the acquisition of
nationality at birth. This is attested to by an examination of the na-
tionality laws of various States, which shows that seventeen are based
solely on jus sanguinis, two equally upon jus sol and jis sanguinis,
twenty-five principally upon jus sanguinis but partly upon jus soli, and
twenty-six principally upon jus soli and partly upon jus sanguinis.
The nationality law of Italy, based principally on jus sanguinis,"
7. Harvard Research, op. cit. supra note 1, at 23.
8. 1 Oppenhein, International Law 584 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1948).
9. Ibid.
10. Harvard Research, op. cit. supra note 1, at 29.
11. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 Raccolta Ufficiale Delle Leggi (hereinafter R.U.JDL.)
II, 555; Flournoy and Hudson, Collection of Nationality Laws 363 (1929). As to the
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follows an old Roman tradition. In Roman law the status of an indi-
vidual was mainly hereditary, and membership in the Roman State de-
pended upon parentage. As the early law of Rome was essentially per-
sonal and not territorial, the right of Roman citizenship at birth was
acquired when the parents, whose condition the child followed, were
Roman citizens. If the child was the issue of free parents united in
lawful marriage, his condition was that of his father; if illegitimate, that
of his mother. In either case, the important factor was descent or
parentage, and not the place of birth. The whole trend of Roman
thought favored the hereditary character of personal status, and for
this reason allegiance jure sanguinis, i.e., by descent or parentage, is
often described as the Roman principle."
While jus sanguinis is the older of the two principles, and while this
principle is now the basis of the nationality laws of most countries of
the continent of Europe as well as of Asia, it is probable that until the
adoption and spread of the Napoleonic Code jus soli was the basis of
nationality in all countries in which the feudal system flourished.13
.us soli is the basis upon which the United States relies. In view of
the fact that this system was inherited from England by the colonies,
a brief historical sketch of its development is of interest.14
The common law of England followed the feudal principle, which
was based on the territorial relation of a fief to its lord, and which, to
some extent, regarded all inhabitants of the soil as appendages to it.
Nationality was determined by the place of a man's birth; hence every
person born within the realm was an English subject and every person
born outside the realm was an alien, regardless of the nationality of his
parents.15
Lord Chief Justice Cookburn stated the rule as follows:
"By the Common Law of England, every person born within the dominions of
the Crown, no matter whether of English or foreign parents, and, in the latter case,
whether the parents were settled, or merely temporarily sojourning, in the country,
kistory of jus sanguinis, see I Weiss, Droit International Prive, c. 1 and 2; Cogordan,
La Nationalite au Point de vue des Rapports Interationaux 1-28 (2d ed. 1890); de
Lapradelle, Nationalite D'Origine 1-28 (1893).
12. Morey, Outlines of Roman Law, bk. 1, c. 1 (1890); Muirhead, Historical Intro-
duction to the Private Law of Rome, c. 3 (1891); 1 Westlake, International Law 212
et seq. (2d ed. 1910).
13. Cogordan, op. cit. supra note 11, at 1-28.
14. For a more comprehensive history of jus soli, see Calvin's Case, 7 Coke 1 (Eng.
1608); Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583 (N.Y. 1844); United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649 (1898); B1. Comm., bk. 1, c. 10; Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United
States, c. 1 (1904); 1 Westlake, op. cit. supra note 12, at 213.
15. Calvin's Case, supra note 14.
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was an English subject; save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who wero
excepted because their fathers carried their own nationality with them), or a child
born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any part of the territories of
England. No effect appears to have been given to descent as a source of nationality 1 0
It was not until the passage of the Act of 25 Edward III (1350), con-
cerning the right of children born abroad to British fathers to inherit
land in England, that the principle of jus sanguinis was introduced into
the English law.17 With the growth of commercial intercourse between
States, a greater number of children of English parents were born in
localities which were not destined to be their permanent home. This led
to further use of descent or parentage as a source of nationality.18
In the United States, jus soli was retained as an inheritance from
Great Britain."9 The United States Supreme Court early assumed and
recognized that all persons born within the United States were citizens,20
and today it is unquestioned that all persons born within the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens.21 Yet, jus
sanguinis was embodied in the first nationality act passed by the Con-
gress of the United States in 1790, which contained a provision to the
effect that children born abroad of American parents were to be "con-
sidered as natural born citizens."22
International law has not adopted either system to the exclusion of
the other. Nor does there seem to be any provision preferring one to
the other as a basis of nationality at birth."
Subsequent to birth, nationality is acquired through the process of
naturalization, which has been defined as "the act of adopting a for-
eigner and clothing him with the privileges of a native citizen."2 4
Naturalization is a judicial process in some countries, including the
16. Cockburn, A Treatise On Nationality 7 (1869).
17. Harvard Research, op. cit. supra note 1, at 29.
18. 1 Westlake, op, cit. supra note 12, at 214-216.
19. Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583 (N.Y. 1844); United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649 (1898). For an interesting anachronism, see Webster, Law of Citizenship
94-100 (1891), in which the author contends that jus soli was never adopted In the
United States, that international law prescribes the jus sanguinis, and that the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States applies only to negroes.
20. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch. 64 (U.S. 1804). This recognition of
the common law principle was followed in later cases: McCreary v. Somerville, 9 Wheat.
354 (U.S. 1824), United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra note 19.
21. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(1) (Supp. 1953).
22. 1 Stat. 104.
23. Harvard Research, op. cit. supra note 1, at 29.
24. Fuller, C. J., in Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 162 (1892). Also, 2 Hyde, Inter-
national Law 1087 (1945) defines naturalization as "the process by which a state adopts
a foreigner and stamps upon him the impress of its own nationality."
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United States,'5 a legislative process in others, and an executive func-
tion in still other countries, including Italy.2
There are several different methods of naturalization. 7 An indi-
vidual may be directly naturalized, on his own right, under general
naturalization laws. He may be derivatively naturalized, as, for exam-
ple, a minor child through the naturalization of his parent or parents.
Derivative naturalization is also available to a wife through the natur-
alization of her husband, or, in some cases, to an alien by marriage to
a national. These last two methods are no longer recognized in the
United States. In addition, adoption of a alien minor results in naturali-
zation in a few countries.
Collective naturalization is possible in either of two ways: through
the transfer of territory from one State to another, or through legisla-
tive enactments covering specific classes of persons. The former method
provides the only case in which international law without an applicable
provision of municipal law declares that a person has the nationality of
the State. It might be said that international law assumes that the suc-
cessor State confers its nationality upon the nationals of the predeces-
sor State residing in the annexed territory at the time of annexation s
Finally, naturalization may result from special legislation in indi-
vidual cases. What a State has the power to do under its general laws
it may also do under a special act, providing a treaty agreement or some
constitutional limitation doesn't prohibit this procedure.
In the United States the power to naturalize foreigners is vested in
the federal government. Congress i9 not trammeled and it may grant
or withhold the privilege upon any grounds or without any reason, as
it sees fit.29
The development of international law has not been such as to pre-
scribe for the States the conditions on which they may confer their na-
tionality upon natural persons. Each State has the power to confer its
nationality, and whether or not it has done so in a given case depends
upon its own national law3  Further, "... in the present state of inter-
national law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion of the court, in
principle within this reserved domain.'
25. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1421 (Supp. 1953).
26. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 R.U.D.L. TI, 555, art. 4; Flournoy and Hudson,
op. ciL supra note 11, at 364.
27. 3 Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 5, at 3.
28. Harvard Research, op. cit. supra note 1, at 61.
29. Terrace et al. v. Thompson, Attorney General of the State of Washington, 263
U.S. 197, 220 (1923); 3 Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 5, at 33.
30. Harvard Research, op. ciL supra note 1, at 24; Tornachio v. Acheson, 93 F.
Supp. 166 (D.D.C. 1951).
31. Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, P.C.IJ., Ser. B. No. 4 (1923) 24; also
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This situation poses two problems for the international community:
1. Is an international body ever competent, against the State's
wishes, to assume jurisdiction over a nationality dispute? This is a
procedural matter.
2. What limitations, if any, are there to this exclusive State power
to impose nationality? The corollary question is to what extent must
such domestic law be recognized by other States? These are substan-
tive matters.
With respect to jurisdictional competence, it is clear that the right of
a State to use its discretion in matters of nationality may be restricted
by international obligations undertaken towards other States.82 The
Permanent Court of International Justice held that the Council of
the League of Nations was competent, under the terms of the Cov-
enant, to deal with a dispute arising out of nationality decrees. The
decrees, by France, purported to confer French nationality upon all
persons born in Tunisia or Morocco of a parent also born there. Great
Britain objected to its application to children born of British nationals
and brought the dispute before the League of Nations. France asserted
that this was a domestic question and denied the League's competence
to deal with it. The Court expressed the opinion that, since the power
of the French Government to issue the decrees might be limited by
treaties to which France and Great Britain were parties, the question
was not purely domestic and could properly be brought before the
Council. In addition, as the case concerned an international protec-
torate, the question of whether the exclusive jurisdiction possessed by
a protecting State in regard to nationality questions in its own terri-
tory extends to the territory of the protected State depends, said the
Court, ". . . upon an examination of the whole question as it appears
from the standpoint of international law. The question, therefore, is no
longer solely one of domestic jurisdiction."3
The same court felt itself competent to interpret a provision concern-
ing the acquisition of Polish nationality under the Minorities Treaty
signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, between the principal Allied Powers
and Poland.34
It is to be observed that in both these instances the facts showed the
existence of factors other than nationality, and the latter may have been
only incidental. It is widely recognized that disputes concerning the
Lord Finlay's dissenting opinion in the Case of the Acquisition of Polish Nationality,
P.C.IJ., Ser. B. No. 7 (1923) 23, 26.
32. 1 Schwarzenberger, International Law 151 (1949).
33. Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, P.C.IJ., Ser. B, No. 4 (1923) 24.
34. Case of the Acquisition of Polish Nationality, P.C.IJ., Ser. B, No. 7 (1923).
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interpretation or performance of treaties, as well as those involving in-
ternational protectorates, are within the province of international law.
The creation of the United Nations Organization tends to limit the
domestic nature of nationality. If nationality legislation is violative
of human rights,35 or tends to impair friendly relations among nations,20
a dispute may, theoretically, come within the competence of this inter-
national body. 7 This would be true despite the prohibition, contained
in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, against interference by the or-
ganization in domestic matters3 s This observation includes both mem-
ber and non-member States, the former because the Charter itself is
considered a treaty obligation, and the latter because the organization
has the duty to insure that they act in accordance with the principles
of that Charter.39
With respect to the substantive problem, Article 1 of the Hague Con-
vention of 1930 on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Na-
tionality Laws stated that municipal law must be recognized by other
States only "insofar as it is consistent with international obligations,
international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized
with regard to nationality.!4
Although it is difficult to pinpoint the international law limitations
upon the State's power to confer its nationality, it is obvious that some
limitations do exist. They are based upon the development of interna-
tional law and upon the fact that different States may be interested in
the allegiance of the same individual, and they have been often stated.41
No bases other than jus soli and jus sanguinus can properly be used
by a State in conferring nationality at birth.42 With respect to natural-
ization, there are also certain limits. For example, if Australia should
attempt to naturalize our Italo-American dual national, who already
possesses nationality, and who has never had any connection with that
State either by way of physical presence in the State or action therein,
or through any relation whatsoever with Australians, it would seem
clear that the limits have been exceeded, and the United States, or
Italy, or both, would have valid grounds for a protest against the
Australian action.
35. U. N. Charter Art. 55
36. U. N. Charter Art. 14.
37. For a general discussion of this problem see Treatment of People of Indian Origin
in South Africa, Yearbook of the United Nations 145 et seq. (1946-1947).
38. Jessup, A Modem Law of Nations 87 (1949).
39. U. N. Charter Art. 1, Par. 6; Kelsen, Law of the United Nations 19 (1950).
40. League of Nations, V. Legal (1930), Hague Convention on Certain Questions Re-
lating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Art. 1.
41. Hall, International Law 267-268 (8th ed. 1924).
42. Harvard Research, op. cit. supra note 1, at 27.
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Further clear violation of international law would be legislation by
Australia which attempted to naturalize as Australian nationals all per-
sons living outside its territory but within 500 miles of it, or all the
Catholics, or Republicans, or members of the white race in the world.
Nor may Australia confer its nationality upon an individual domiciled
within its limits against the will of that individual. However, consent
to the naturalization may be expressed, or it may be shown through an
act which shows the desire and intention of a person to take the na-
tionality of the State. The act in such a case must have a direct relation
to nationality.43
Occasion for protest against violations have rarely arisen, but there
are some specific instances recorded in diplomatic annals. The United
States and certain European States have protested against the applica-
tion, to their nationals, of laws and decrees of Peru, Spain (with refer-
ence to Cuba), Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil, under which it was at-
tempted to impose the nationality of those countries upon aliens within
their territory, without their consent, upon various grounds, such as
marriage to native women, residence, and acquisition of real property.
4
"
Of course, these cases should be differentiated from those in which
the acquisition of nationality is made a condition precedent to the
same aforementioned acts. In that event the requirement of consent
by the alien is fulfilled.
Conversely, the question might arise whether the State which natu-
ralizes the national of another State or an international tribunal has
to pay attention either to prohibitions on the part of a State regarding
the acquisition of another nationality by its citizen or to municipal
legislation making such matters dependent on its consent. This was
answered in the negative by the Franco-Turkish Mixed Arbitral Tri-
bunal in the case of Apostolidis v. Turkey (1928). 4 1" The claimant, a
Turkish subject, acquired French nationality by naturalization. Under
Turkish law such a naturalization, if taking place without the previ-
ously obtained consent of the Turkish Government, was declared to be
without any legal effect. Turkey, therefore, contended that, as in that
case no such authorization had been given, the claimant continued to be
a Turkish subject and consequently the Tribunal was incompetent to
deal with his claim. The Tribunal overruled the objection and held
43. Hall, op. cit. supra note 41.
44. 3 Moore, Digest of International Law 302-311 (1906).
45. 2 Mixed Arbitral Tribunals (hereinafter M.A.T.) 71, 72 (1923). Also Baron Fred-
eric de Born v. Yugoslavia, 6 M.A.T. 499 (1926); Barthez de Montford v. Trcuhandcr
Haupterwaltung, 6 M.A.T. 806 (1926), and the Pinson Case (1928) between France and
Mexico, 39 Revue General de Droit International Public 230, 419 (1932).
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that the Turkish law could only bind Turkish authorities and courts.
The organs of other States and international courts had to recognize
a naturalization carried out in accordance with the laws of the State
which had granted naturalization. Hence it was the duty of the Tri-
bunal under international law to consider the claimant as a French na-
tional.
Nationality Status of the American Citizen of Italian Origin
A person who is claimed as a subject or citizen by two States is said
to possess dual nationality, which is not a theory or doctrine, but a
legal condition which is an unavoidable result of the conflicting laws
of different countries."' "Municipal law determines how citizenship
may be acquired," so "it follows that persons may have a dual nation-
ality.; 47
To find out whether an individual is an Italo-American dual national,
it is necessary to examine the provisions of the municipal laws which
deal with the acquisition and loss of nationality in the countries con-
cerned. This section will begin with a brief discussion of the acquisi-
tion of nationality in both Italian and American law. It will then
determine how these same laws provide for its loss. The section will
end with ait application of the laws to hypothetical cases, followed by
what is believed to be an exhaustive summary of the possible ways of
acquiring dual nationality as a result of Italo-American legislation.
All persons born in the United States, including Alaska, Hawaii,
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and Guam, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof are citizens at birth."' In this category is a child of un-
known parentage found in the United States. 0
Also classified as a citizen at birth is a child born in an outlying
possession of one citizen parent and a parent who is a national. '0 So is
a child born outside the United States to: a) citizen parents, one of
whom has been physically present in the United States prior to the
birth of the child; 5 ' b) a citizen parent who has been physically present
in the United States for a period of ten years prior to the birth of the
child.52 In the last two cases, citizenship is conditional, and may be lost
46. Secretary Lansing to Senator Lodge, June 9, 1915, Ms. Dep't State, Me 365.
117/106; 3 Hackworth, op. dt. supra note 5, at 352.
47. Perkins v. Ig, 307 U.S. 325, 329 (1939).
48. 8 U.S.C-A. § 1401(a)(1) (Supp. 1953).
49. 8 -US.CA. § 1401(a) (6) (Supp. 1953).
50. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a) (4) (Supp. 1953).
51. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(3) (Supp. 1953).
52. Ibid.
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if the child does not attain five years of physical presence in the United
States between the ages of fourteen and twenty-three. 8
Finally, citizenship may be acquired by naturalization. A minor
child under age 16 derives citizenship when both parents are natu-
ralized, 4 or, in the event one parent is a citizen without ten years physl-
cal presence in the United States, when the other parent is naturalized."
This latter is also true of a child having only one custodial parent. 0
In all these cases, however, citizenship arises only if the child is resid-
ing in the United States at the time of naturalization, or takes up per-
manent residence before age sixteen.57
In Italy, citizenship arises at birth when the father is a citizen, 8 or
when the mother is a citizen if the father is unknown, stateless, or un-
able to confer his citizenship on his child. 9 Also, citizens are those born
in Italy who are unable to acquire their parents' citizenship.00
A child born in Italy, or born elsewhere of parents residing in Italy
ten years prior to his birth, will become a citizen when he serves in the
army or, when residing in Italy upon attaining his majority, he elects
Italian citizenship.0 ' Citizenship automatically arises if he himself re-
sided in Italy ten years and doesn't express his desire to keep his origi-
nal citizenship. 2
Italian citizenship may also be conferred by executive deqree.03 This
automatically results in citizenship for the wife and minor unemanci-
pated children."
Generally, nationality may be lost voluntarily, involuntarily, or de-
rivatively. An individual loses nationality voluntarily through express
53. Ibid.
54. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1431(a) (Supp. 1953).
55. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1432 (a) (1) (Supp. 1953).
56. 8 U.S.CA. § 1432 (a) (2) (3) (Supp. 1953).
57. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1432 (a) (4) (5) (Supp. 1953).
58. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 R.UJ).L. H, 555, art. 1 (1); Flournoy and Hudson,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 363.
59. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 R.U.D.L. II, 555, art. 1 (2); Flournoy and Hudson,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 363.
60. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 R.U.D.L. II, 555, art. 1 (3); Flournoy and Hudson,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 363.
61. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 R.U.D.L. II, 555, art. 3 (1) (2); Flournoy and Hud-
son, op. cit. supra note 11, at 363.
62. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 R.U.D.L. II, 555, art. 3 (3); Flournoy and Hudson,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 363.
63. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 R.U.D.L. IU, 555, art. 4; Flournoy and Hudson, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 364.
64. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 R.U.D.L. II, 555, arts. 10 and 12; Flournoy and Hud-
son, op. cit. supra note 11, at 365, 366.
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renunciation, naturalization in a foreign State, prolonged stay abroad,
accepting public office or performing military service for a foreign State,
and voting in a foreign election. Involuntarily it is lost by the action
of the State through the process of denaturalization, i.e., revoking the
naturalization of a naturalized citizen when procured by fraud, ille-
gality, etc., or through denationalization, i.e., by stripping a citizen of
his nationality as a punishment. It may also be involuntarily lost through
cession of territory and imposition of the nationality of the acquiring
State.
Finally, it may be lost through the action of another, as when the
loss of nationality by the husband results in loss to the wife, and the
loss of nationality by the parent results in loss to the child.
The most generally accepted way for an individual to lose his na-
tionality is through voluntary naturalization in another State.5 With
respect to the efficacy of such action, the States of the world are divided
into two groups: the countries of emigration, and the countries of immi-
gration. It is in the interests of the former, the country of origin, to
prevent certain of its nationals from renouncing their nationality in
order to avoid certain obligations. Hence, in these cases, loss of na-
tionality may not surely result from subsequent voluntary naturaliza-
tion on the part of the individual concerned. In addition, certain con-
ditions, possibly including the issuance of expatriation permits, are
laid down before their nationals are allowed to lose their nationality.
On the other hand, the countries of immigration favor the princi-
ple that naturalization abroad necessarily involves the loss of previous
nationality. They are of the opinion that the system of authorization
for obtaining freedom from allegiance is antiquated, not taking into
account the conditions of modern life or of the right which every per-
son possesses to change his allegiance freely.
The right of expatriation has been asserted as a natural right of
man,6" but it has not yet become a part of the general practice."7 In
the United States, several of the early cases adhered to the view that
there existed no right of expatriation. 8 However, since the enactment
of the Statute of 1868,6" the Government has unhesitatingly and un-
65. For a summary of the laws of various countries on the effect of naturalization on
the prior nationality see Harvard Research, op. cit. supra note 1, at 45-SI.
66. "It [the right of expatriation] is a principle of the rights of man and of the liberty
of the human race:" Air. Hunter Miler (Delegate of the United States), Acts of the
Conference for the Codification of International Law, Meetings of the Committee 80.
See also ibid, at 69 (Mr. Flournoy).
67. 1 Oppenheim, op. it. supra note 8, at 591.
68. Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242 (US. 1830); Ainslee v. Martin, 9 Mass. 454 (1813).
69. Rev. Stat. § 1999 (1875), as amended, 8 US.C.A. §§ 1482, 1483 (Supp. 1953).
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compromisingly insisted on the right of the individual to lose his na-
tionality by virtue of his voluntary act. The statute was originally
aimed at establishing the right of immigrants to the United States to
renounce their former nationality, but it also allowed the voluntary
renunciation of American citizenship.70
Loss of nationality was further facilitated with the passage of the
Nationality Act of 1940,71 when the emphasis appeared to shift from
the individual's right to choose nationality to the power of the Gov-
ernment to compel expatriation. This shift has continued in the Na-
tionality Act of 1952.72 Today it is relatively simple to lose Ameri-
can nationality.
Under existing American law, the first distinction to be made with
respect to expatriatory acts is the character of the individual perform-
ing the act, i.e., a citizen at birth, or a naturalized citizen. Some of
the acts apply to all citizens, others only to naturalized citizens. Those
which apply to all citizens may be further subdivided into two cate-
gories: first, the acts inimical to allegiance to the United States and
for which residence abroad, either at the time of the act or subse-
quently, is necessary; and second, those which are directly hostile to
the Government and are punished by expatriation, regardless of where
they occur.
In the first category, the most direct way of losing nationality is by
making a formal renunciation before a diplomatic or consular officer
of the United States in a foreign State in such a manner as prescribed
by the Secretary of State.73 Other acts inconsistent with allegiance to
the United States include the obtaining of naturalization in a foreign
State, 4 taking an oath or making any other formal declaration of
allegiance to a foreign State,75 or entering into the armed forces of a
foreign State without the prior authorization in writing from the Sec-
retary of State and the Secretary of Defense. 0 In addition, loss of
nationality will result from accepting employment under the govern-
ment of a foreign State,77 or voting in a political election or partici-
pating in a plebiscite to determine sovereignty over foreign territory.78
It must be remembered that these acts, committed in the United
70. Immigration and Nationality, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 731 (1953).
71. 8 U.S.CA. § 801, et seq. (1946).
72. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401, et seq. (Supp. 1953).
73. 8 U.S.CA. § 1481 (a) (6) (Supp. 1953).
74. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481 (a) (1) (Supp. 1953).
75. 8 U.S.CA. § 1481 (a) (2) (Supp. 1953).
76. 8 U.S.CA. § 1481 (a) (3) (Supp. 1953).
77. 8 U.S.CA.. § 1481 (a) (4) (Supp. 1953).
78. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481 (a((5) (Supp. 1953).
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States, will not result in expatriation, but they will have that effect
as soon as the individual takes up residence in a foreign State."0
Those acts in the second category, for which expatriation is a pun-
ishment, include deserting the military, air, or naval forces of the
United States in time of war;80 committing an act of treason, or at-
tempting, by force, to overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United
States; 81 departing from or remaining outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States in time of war, or during a national emergency,
for the purpose of avoiding military service.82
If the individual performing the above acts is also a national of the
State wherein the acts are performed, and had lived therein the prior
ten years, there is a conclusive presumption that the act is done volun-
tarily and without duress.8 3 In all other cases, the individual may show
that the act was not freely done.
An act within the United States which will cause loss of citizenship
is the making of a formal renunciation therein while the country is at
war, unless the Attorney General deems the attempted renunciation con-
trary to the national interest.8 - This latter represents the only limita-
tion, in United States legislation, on the right of expatriation.
In addition to the aforementioned acts, there are others which result
in loss of nationality only for the naturalized citizen. This occurs if the
latter has a continuous residence for three years in the territory of a
foreign State of which he was formerly a national, or in which the place
of his birth is situated." The term of continuous residence is extended
to five years if the residence is in any other StateY0 Residence in such
cases is considered continuous where there is a continuity of stay, but
not necessarily an uninterrupted physical presence, in a foreign State or
States outside the United States.8 7 This continuity cannot be broken
by short visits to the United States where there is actual residence
abroad. There are exceptions88 to these provisions, but they are gen-
erally of little importance.
Somewhat the same provision is made for divestiture of nationality
of a dual national, but here there is loss only if the status arose at birth
79. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1483 (a) (Supp. 1953).
80. s US.C.A. § 1481 (a) (8) (Supp. 1953).
81. s U.S.C.A. § 1481 (a) (9) (Supp. 1953).
82. s U.S.C.A. § 1481 (a) (10) (Supp. 1953).
83. S U.S.CA. § 1481 (b) (Supp. 1953).
84. 8 U.S.CA. § 1481 (a) (7) (Supp. 1953).
85. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1484 (a)(1) (Supp. 1953).
86. 8 US.C.A. § 1484 (a) (2) (Supp. 1953).
87. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (a) (33) (Supp. 1953).
88. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1485, 1486 (Supp. 1953).
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and the individual has voluntarily sought the benefits of the nationality
of the foreign State, and in addition, has lived continuously for three
years in that State after the age of twenty-two.89 However, within
the three year period, loss may be avoided by taking an oath of alle-
giance to the United States before a diplomatic or consular officer. 0
Nationality may also be derivatively lost, but only if such person
has, or acquires the nationality of the other State. However, there is a
limitation. It is not lost until the child attains the age of twenty-five
years without having established his residence in the United States.91
It can be seen from a perusal of American nationality legislation that
there are indeed many ways in which an individual may expatriate
himself. The law seems designed for expatriation.
The Italian law specifically permits the loss of citizenship of an indi-
vidual either through the direct action of the individual himself, or of
the State, or derivatively. The latter category includes married women
and minor, unemancipated children.
A female citizen who marries a foreigner loses Italian citizenship if
her husband possesses a citizenship which may be communicated to her
by the marriage;92 if her husband, being a citizen, becomes a foreigner,
his wife, having residence in common with him, loses Italian citizen-
ship. 3
Minor, non-emancipated children of those who lose citizenship be-
come foreigners if they possess residence in common with the parent
who is head of the household, and if they acquire the citizenship of the
foreign country. 4
Loss by direct action is provided for in Articles 7 and 8 of the Law
of 13 June 1912.11 Article 7 states that an Italian citizen born and
residing in a foreign nation, which considers him a citizen of its own
by birth, may abandon Italian citizenship when he becomes of age or
is emancipated. The law provides elsewhere that the abandonment must
be made in the form of an express renunciation before a diplomatic or
89. 8 U.S.CA. § 1482 (Supp. 1953).
90. 8 U.S.CA. § 1482 (1) (Supp. 1953).
91. 8 U.S.CA. § 1487 (Supp. 1953).
92. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 R.D.L.U. 1, 555, art. 10; Flournoy and Hudson, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 365.
93. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 R.D.L.U. 1, 555, art. 11; Flournoy and Hudson, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 365.
94. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 R.D.L.U. 1, 555, art. 12; Flournoy and Hudson, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 366.
95. 1912 R.D.L.U. II, 555; Flournoy and Hudson, op. cit. supra note 11, at 363
et seq.
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consular agent at the place where the renouncing citizen resides."
Article 8 provides as follows:
"One loses citizenship:
"(1) When he of his own free will acquires a foreign citizenship and establishes
or has established his residence abroad.
"(2) When, having acquired a foreign citizenship independently of his own
will, one declares that he renounces Italian citizenship, and establishes or has
established his residence abroad.
"In the cases contemplated in paragraphs I and 2, the government may except
the transfer of the residence abroad.
"(3) When having accepted employment from a foreign government, or
having assumed the military service of a foreign power, he persists in that po-
sition, in spite of the Italian Government's instruction to abandon within a
fixed lapse of time the said employment or service."
With respect to loss of citizenship by virtue of Article 8, Italian
legislation designates the form of the renunciation to be taken in the
event of involuntary acquisition of foreign citizenship. It does not,
however, specify whether express renunciation need be made if foreign
citizenship is voluntarily acquired. This gap has been interpreted in
various ways by the Italian courts. The earlier decisions state that to
"lose citizenship it is not enough to acquire foreign citizenship; it is
necessary to expressly renounce the citizenship of origin,"017 whereas
the later ones speak of "the spontaneous acquisition of foreign citizen-
ship and the consequent loss of Italian citizenship."0 8 Because of the
not-binding-as-a-precedent status of Italian cases, it is difficult to state
precisely whether in any given instance voluntary acquisition of foreign
citizenship, i.e., naturalization abroad, is effective without an express
renunciation. Until the legislative branch of the government authori-
tatively interprets the citizenship law, or until constant jurisprudential
interpretation is developed, the uncertainty will continue.
It is submitted, however, that the sounder view at the present time
is that naturalization abroad will result in loss of Italian citizenship
even though there is no express renunciation.
To complicate matters, however, the same Article 8 adds the proviso
that loss of citizenship under that article does not absolve an individual
from the obligation of military service. Thus, though it is unquestion-
96. Royal Decree of Aug. 2, 1912, 1912 R.D.L.U. II, 949, art. 6, Flournoy and Hud-
son, op. cit. supra note 11, at 368. 7
97. Reda v. Cassa, Court of Cassation, Feb. 11, 1943, 8 Foro Italiano (Repertorio)
(hereinafter Foro It. (Rep.)) 281 (1943-1945); See also DAmelio v. Saglietti, Court of
Appeals Genova, July 15, 1940, 1943 Rivista Di Diritto Mlatrimoniale 33m.
98. Societa Officina Zanzi v. Zublena, Court of Cassation, Apr. 28, 1949, 1949 Giuris-
prudenza Cassazione Civile II, 320, 321.
1954]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ably true that the Italian citizen may lose his citizenship, it is equally
certain that all ties with Italy are not severed."
A further complication is to be noted. Military service subsequent
to loss of citizenship will automatically result in the reacquisition of the
lost citizenship.' 0 Nothing has to be done by the individual. It has
been argued that this is not so in the case of those who have voluntarily
renounced citizenship because they are not worthy of being Italians,101
but this position has not received official support.
In conclusion, on loss of Italian nationality, from a perusal of Italian
legislation, commentary and case law, it is probable that a dual national
at birth, born and residing abroad, may effectively renounce his Italian
nationality (including citizenship), thus escaping the obligation of mili-
tary service. All other male nationals will lose Italian nationality by
acquisition of a foreign one. If the acquisition is voluntary, it is prob-
ably not necessary to expressly renounce Italian nationality. This,
however, is uncertain, so it is advisable to take advantage of the pre-
scribed form of renunciation. If the acquisition is involuntary, Italian
nationality is lost only if there is an express renunciation. All these
who have lost Italian nationality are still tied to Italy by the obligation
of military service, which may restore their Italian nationality. Wives
and minor, unemancipated children follow, respectively, the condition
of the husband and the father.
To appreciate how these laws may conflict and thus give rise to dual
nationality, let us apply them to assumed factual situations.
First, let us assume that a child, Joe, is born in New York City in
1920, the son of an Italian father. Having been born in the United
States, Joe acquired American nationality at birth. In addition, he
simultaneously acquired Italian nationality, jure sanguinis, through his
Italian father. It is clear that he is a dual national birth. However, he
may divest himself of his dual nationality when he comes of age by re-
nouncing either nationality.
Second, let us assume that Tony is born in Italy in 1930, of Italian
parents who subsequently emigrate to the United States in 1932,
leaving the child with grandparents in Italy. The mother becomes in-
dependently naturalized in the United States in 1937, and Tony joins
99. This conclusion is partly based on the restrictive attitude of the present Italian
Republlc which is to be contrasted with the desire of the former Fascist Government to
claim as Italian Nationals all those abroad. The present government, for the moment,
does not so claim.
100. Law of June 13, 1912, 1912 R.D.L.U. II, 55, art. 9 (1); Flournoy and Hud-
son, op. cit. supra note 11, at 364.
101. Buzzati, La Legge Sulla Cittandinanza 13 Giugno 1912, 130 (1914).
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the family in 1938. This situation is more complicated than the first
one. Tony, like Joe, is an Italian citizen at birth. By American law,
he did not become derivatively naturalized in 1937 since he lived in
Italy. He acquired American citizenship in 1943 in accordance with
the Act of May 24, 1934.12
Section 2 of that Act reads as follows:
"That a child born vithout the United States of alien parents shall be deemed
a citizen of the United States by virtue of the naturalization of or resumption of
American citizenship by the father or the mother; provided, That such naturaliza-
tion or resumption shall take place during the minority of such child: And pro-
vided further, That the citizenship of such minor child shall begin five years
after the time such minor child begins to reside permanently in the United
States."
Italy would refuse to recognize such a derivative naturalization be-
cause it was obtained through the mother, hence Tony is a dual na-
tional. It seems, however, that he too may take advantage of expatria-
tory provisions in the laws of either country.
As a conclusion to this section, it may be helpful to give what is
thought to be an exhaustive enumeration of the cases of dual nationality
which may arise, at birth or subsequently, as a result of the conflicts
in the present nationality legislation of the United States and Italy.
Those arising at birth are:
1. birth in the United States of Italian father;
2. birth in the United States of an unknown father and a mother
who is an Italian citizen;
3. birth in Italy of an Italian father and an American mother
who, prior to the birth of the child, was physically present in the United
States for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years.
Those arising subsequent to birth are:
1. birth in Italy of American parents, one of whom has had, prior
to the birth of the child, a residence in the United States or one of its
outlying possessions, coupled with residence in Italy by the child for at
least ten years and non-declaration of American citizenship by him
before the age of twenty-two;
2. birth out of wedlock in the United States, of a American mother
and an Italian father, with the subsequent legitimation through the
Italian father;
3. birth out of wedlock, outside of the United States, of an Ameri-
can mother who had been physically present in the United States or
its outlying possessions for one year before the child's birth, and legiti-
mation through the Italian father;
102. 48 Stat. 797.
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4. birth in the United States, of American parents, with the sub-
sequent naturalization of the father in Italy;
5. marriage of an American woman to an Italian citizen;
6. birth in Italy of Italian parents, emigration to the United States,
and the subsequent naturalization, prior to 1940, of the mother.
With the exception of the last case, these are instances of dual na-
tionality arising out of the existing nationality laws of the two countries.
It can be seen that the primary cause of dual nationality is, at birth,
the classical conflict between jus soli and jus sanguinis, and by natu-
ralization, the refusal of the Italian Government to recognize the
naturalization of an Italian woman when it produces a nationality
different from that of her husband. Other cases of dual nationality have
arisen in the past under then existing laws, but possibilities under these
are not considered here.
II. THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF DUAL NATIONALITY
Introduction
Once it is established that the individual is a national of a State,
certain consequences follow. Under existing international law, the rights
of an individual in the international sphere are derived from those of
the State, or States, of which he is a national, and it is normally only
such State or States that may press his claim for injuries before inter-
national tribunals or through diplomatic channels. The rights are de-
rived from the State in that they are based on the State's rights to
claim redress for injury to its national. If the individual is given such
rights under treaties, it is usually in his status as a national of one of
the parties to the treaty. In addition, the State must protect the na-
tional and his property abroad; it must allow him to sojourn in its
territory.
Conversely, nationality is recognized as a basis for the State's juris-
diction over the individual, affecting his rights under municipal law
and subjecting him to diverse obligations. This jurisdiction, arising
ratione personae, means that the State may exercise exclusive jurisdic-
tion over its national within its borders and concurrent jurisdiction over
its nationals abroad.103 The national legislation of a State and its judi-
cial jurisdiction may extend to persons, acts and property outside of
its territory, so long as the application in the concrete case takes place
within the State's own territory.104 International law allows the State
a wide measure of discretion, leaving it "free to adopt principles which
it regards as best and most suitable"'0° for control over its national.
103. Schwarzenberger, op. cit. supra note 32, at 79.
104. Id. at 80.
105. The S. S. Lotus, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 (1927) 18.
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This means that a national is always subject to personal jurisdiction.
This jurisdiction includes judicial and legislative control, i.e., amena-
bility to legal process, and civil and criminal liability for acts commit-
ted within and without the territorial limits of the State. The latter,
when it deems it necessary for public interest and welfare, may exer-
cise this jurisdiction through municipal legislation. International law
does not ordinarily interfere, but some limitations on the State's free-
dom to exercise its legislative jurisdiction may arise from the duty of
the State having personal supremacy, i.e., claiming the individual as
a national, to respect the territorial supremacy, i.e., physical control of
the individual, of the foreign State. Thus, for instance, a State is pre-
vented from requiring such acts from its nationals abroad as are for-
bidden to them by the municipal law of the land in which they are
physically present; nor may the State order its nationals not to commit
such acts as they are bound to commit by the municipal law of the
territorial State.'
This part will first discuss the substantive law obligations arising from
the existence of the nationality relationship between the individual and
the State. In this connection, such matters as military service, taxation
and allegiance in time of war will be discussed. The chapter will then
deal with the application of judicial jurisdiction vis-a-vis the national.
It will end with a consideration of the State's duty to protect its na-
tional and espouse his claims.
The National's Responsibility Towards the State
The most severe obligation of citizenship, or nationality, and its per-
manent allegiance is military service.' Both the United States and
Italy require military service of its nationals.
The Universal Military Training and Service Act provides for the
registration for military service of every male between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-six, who is a citizen of the United States, or an
alien admitted for permanent residence. 08 Foreign nationals are en-
titled to certain dispensations from conscription for military service.
They cannot be compelled to take part in war directed against their
own country, 10 9 and they may enjoy particular treaty privileges.110 The
alien may also assert his alienage to prevent his induction into the
armed forces. No such provision is made for a dual national; hence,
106. Oppenheim, op. dt. supra note 8, at 256-257.
107. In re Siem, 284 F. 868 (D. Mont. 1922).
108. 50 U.S.C.AL App. § 454 (a) (1951).
109. Harrisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
110. Moser v. U.S., 341 U.S. 41 (1951).
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he may not rely on his non-American nationality to escape the draft.
Evasion of the obligation to perform military service carries penalties.
In addition to the ordinary fine and imprisonment, it entails the loss of
privileges."' For the citizen who evades the draft in time of war or
national emergency there is loss of citizenship.112
According to Italian law, the following are subject to conscription:
all male citizens to age fifty-five; those who lost citizenship but are
still subject to military service; all stateless persons who reside in the
Kingdom (Republic)."13 Not subject to the draft are those possessing
citizenship without political rights or those who acquired citizenship by
royal decree with express exemption from military service. 14 Aliens
who can't become citizens through military service cannot enlist in the
armed forces without authorization from the executive branch of the
government." 15
Special provision is made for citizens residing abroad."10 They are
exempt until they return to Italy. Those who return prior to the age
of thirty-two will be called for military service with the next class
drafted; those returning after the age of thirty-two will not be called
unless there is a mobilization of their class. The Italian citizen born
abroad and having the nationality of the place of birth will not be
called at all, providing he proves service in the regular army of his
country of birth. It is to be noted, however, that mere temporary re-
turn to Italy for the purpose of study or business, for periods of twelve,
six, or three months, depending on the citizen's foreign residence, i.e.,
respectively, transoceanic, Mediterranean or European, does not subject
the returnee to military service.
All this is of particular concern to the American citizen of Italian
origin. As we have already seen,"17 the Law of 13 June 1912 provides,
in Article 8, for loss of citizenship in certain enumerated cases. The
same Article adds, however, that "the loss of citizenship contemplated
in this article does not exempt one from the obligations of military
service, except as regards facilities granted by special laws." Thus, the
Italian citizen who has lost his citizenship is still liable for the per-
formance of military service.
That this law has been vigorously exercised in the past is evidenced
111.. For the alien who pleads alienage there is loss of the privilege of naturalizatlon:
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 454 (a) (1951). Also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1426 (a) (Supp. 1953).
112. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481 (a)(10) (Supp. 1953).
113. Law of Feb. 24, 1938, 1938 R.D.L.U. I 229, art. 1.
114. Ibid.
115. Law of Feb. 24, 1938, 1938 R.D.L.U. I 329, art. 135.
116. Law of Feb. 24, 1938, 1938 R.D.L.U. I 329, arts. 119-127.
117. See note 95 supra.
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by numerous and repeated objections of the United States to the appli-
cation of the Italian draft laws to American citizens. Shortly after the
passage of the Law of 13 June 1912, many American citizens of Italian
origin were impressed into Italian military service. The American am-
bassador protested, but to no avail, since the Italian Government took
the position that by Italian Law these men were liable to military serv-
ice. Despite this position, the Department of State continued to protest
consistently and vigorously. The situation was summarized in a dis-
patch of April 1, 1915, from the Charge d'Affaires at Rome which read
as follows:
"The phrases 'detained by military authorities,' or 'refused permission to
return to the United States,' which are used by the applicants and in correspond-
ence between the Department and the Embassy should perhaps be briefly ex-
plained.
"No Italian subject of military age, i.e., under 39, is permitted to leave Italy
without permission; and in consequence the steamship companies generally refuse
to sell tickets to anyone not provided with such permission. Moreover, the ship
is searched at the port of departure and those bearing an Italian name, even
if furnished with a foreign passport are obliged to give proof that they are
entitled to leave.
"It will be seen, therefore, that the military authorities are only indirectly
detaining the applicants, except in those rare cases where he is actually under
arms, either performing his regular military service or serving in one of the few
classes of First Reserves now mobilized."I' s
During the progress of the First World War, the Italian Government
went further and adopted the practice of detaining in Italy the wives
and children of naturalized American citizens of Italian origin for the
purpose of compelling the husbands and fathers to return to Italy for
military service. After protests, however, Italy permitted the unrestrict-
ed departure of such wives and children.
With the coming into power of the Fascist Government, the situation
became more acute. In answer to an inquiry by the American Embassy,
the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs issued the following statement:
"As is well known, the Fascist Government, which has bent every effort toward
developing or creating the movement of the Italians residing abroad toward their
mother country, announced some time ago that no question of citizenship would
be raised against the travelers who, born abroad of Italian parents, might arrive
in the Kingdom with a passport issued by the authorities of the country of
their birth.
"Since that statement, however tranquilizing in respect to the question of citizen-
ship, has left it open to doubt whether those citizens of Italian origin born abroad,
118. The Charge d'Affaires at Rome (Jay) to the Secretary of State (Bryan), No.
274, Apr. 1, 1915, Ms. Dep't State file 367.117/78; 1915 For. Rel. S56-557, quoted in 3
Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 5, at 187.
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when subject to army obligations in Italy, might be exposed to difficulties, It is
proper to elucidate that point, absolutely and finally, as follows:
"1. Citizens residing abroad are, by operation of Law No. 2959 of December 24,
1928, exempted from military service in the time of peace while living abroad.
"2. By the operation of the same law, when they come to Italy they may have
a permit to remain there in time of peace for one year if residents of trans-oceanic
countries, six months if residents of the Mediterranean basin and three months
if residents of Europe, without their undergoing during those periods the obliga-
tions to report for duty in the army.
"3. Leaving aside the said provisions of law, the Fascist Government, taking
into account the proportion between the members called into the army and the
force appropriated for by the financial laws, would have no interest in subjecting
to military service in time of peace the citizens who live in remote places, such as
those that are beyond the ocean, in place of soldiers residing at nearer places, if
not in Italy itself, and, therefore, under all circumstances, except those of war, the
Italian citizens residing beyond the ocean with any passport with which they may
present themselves in the Kingdom, whether issued by the Italian authorities or by
the authorities of the foreign country where they were born, can only be considered
as a 'surplus' ('esuberanti') in the military service in time of peace, and therefore
exempt from any molestation in the matter of military obligations, even past ones,
provided they are not wartime obligations."' 9
With the overthrow of the Fascist Government and the institution of
the Republic, the situation may have eased. In a recent decision, an
Italian Court indicated that the application of Article 8110 has been re-
stricted.12' The court, in an action for draft evasion by the Ministry
of War against a dual national born and residing abroad decided that
the reservation in Article 8 regarding non-exemption from military serv-
ice for all those who have lost citizenship is applicable only to those
citizens who had been expatriated under the provisions of the same
Article 8. Since in this case the defendant had lost his citizenship by
express renunciation under the terms of Article 7, it was held that he
was no longer an Italian citizen and consequently was not required to
undergo military service. 2
119. 3 Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 5, at 188-189. For the text of this statement
as it appeared in the American press, see the N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1929, p. 1, col. 7.
120. See note 95 supra.
121. Minlstero della Guerra v. Canessa, Court of Appeals Genova, Aug. 21, 1947,
3 Foro Padano 184 (1948).
122. Whether this case represents a true indication of the position of the Italian Gov-
ernment is debatable. In a note to the decision, the commentator suggested that the
court had failed to mention the fact that the case could have been properly decided on
the basis of the Law of July 17, 1933, 538, art. 3, which provides that "the Italian citi-
zen, born and residing in a country where he is a citizen by birth, is exempt from the
obligation of military service if he can prove that he has served in the regular armed
forces of the country of his birth." 3 Foro Padano 183-184 (1948). Notwithstanding
this apparent objection, and the fact that this is a lower court decision, it is the author's
belief that it is a wedge in the hitherto adamant position of the Italian government,
and that it is likely to be followed.
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The most recent example of the dilemma produced by conflicting mili-
tary obligations was reported in an American newspaper." Alfonso
Mazzarella, a 21 year old naturalized citizen of the United States, was
scheduled for induction under the Universal Military Service and Train-
ing Act." 4 He decided to get married and went to Italy for that pur-
pose, fully intending to return to the United States in time for induc-
tion. While on his honeymoon, he was arrested by the Italian police
who charged him with being a compulsory military service evader. The
Italian authorities, as reported by the paper, drafted him into the
Italian Army for a period of twenty minutes,'-" gave him an honorable
discharge, and returned his American passport.
This case, however, seems to be an anomaly'2O in view of the exist-
ence of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between
the United States and the Italian Republic, signed at Rome on February
2, 1948, and entering into force on July 26, 1949.127 Article XII,
paragraph 1 of that treaty provides:
"The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall be exempt ... from com-
pulsory military training or service in the armed forces of the other High Contract-
ing Party, and shall also be exempt from all contributions in money or in kind im-
posed in lieu thereof."
This has been interpreted, by the Italian Consulate, to mean that
those former Italian citizens now naturalized in the United States but
still owing military service to Italy may be exempt from those obliga-
tions. 28 All that is required of the former Italian citizen, in the event
123. N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1953, p. 4, col. 4.
124. See note 103 supra.
125. It is interesting to speculate what effect this will have on Mfazzarella's American
citizenship under the Nationality Act of 1952 (see note 75 supra). He could possibly
resist expatriation on the ground that the act was involuntary.
126. There is no indication that the American Embassy intervened, and this leads to
the conclusion that the facts as reported may have been incomplete, or that Mfazzarella
was not in possession of proper documentary evidence (see note 129 infra), or that the
Italian officials concerned acted erroneously and subsequently corrected thenselves.
127. U.S. Treaty Series No. 1965 (Dep't State 1948); Law of June 8, 1949, 1949
R.D.L.U. 11 383.
128. It seems odd that the Department of State, in its booklet on Information for
Bearers of Passports, issued Dec. 24, 1952, should have ignored the existence of the
treaty. The following statement appears in the booklet: "There is no treaty between
the United States and Italy defining the status while in Italy of former Italians who have
become naturalized as American citizens nor of persons who were born in the United
States of Italian parents. However, in view of the reduction of the Italian armed forces
required by the Treaty of Peace with Italy dated at Paris February 10, 1947, which
entered into force on September 15, 1947, it is not considered that American citizens
of Italian origin who have maintained their principal place of abode in the United States
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that he is going to Italy, is that he present himself to the consul and
apply for examination. 2 9 The applicant must show his original natu-
ralization certificate, and on this basis, the Italian Consul will give him
a consular certification of the facts of his naturalization. This docu-
ment may then be used by the former Italian citizen to prevent his
being molested in Italy by the Italian authorities.
This treaty, however, is not considered applicable to dual nationals.
A similar provision in a commerce and navigation treaty between Italy
and San Salvador was so construed by an Italian court. 80
Another burden imposed on the national is that of financially sup-
porting his State through the payment of taxes. There is no doubt that
a citizen may be .taxed, even if he is outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the State. 13oa A native citizen of the United States, who was a per-
manent resident of, and domiciled in, Mexico, and whose income was
derived solely from property outside the limits of the United States and
its possessions, was held liable to the United States for income tax pay-
ments.13  Thus, in this instance, also, the dual national is in an un-
enviable position since he is exposed to tax claims by the two States
claiming his allegiance.
After military service, that which causes the most concern to the dual
national is the existence of a state of war between the countries of which
he is a national. Many restrictions are placed on the enemy, and as a
consequence, the dual national is likely to suffer.
An American statute authorizes the restraint and detention in war-
will be required to perform military service while in Italy. This applies to persons
born in Italy who became naturalized in the United States, persons born in Italy of
American parents and persons born in the United States of Italian parents. It is pointed
out, however, that this government cannot properly protest against punishment for any
infraction of military service or other laws committed prior to a naturalized American's
entry into the United States."
This seems completely erroneous, and should be brought to the attention of the De-
partment.
129. The following form is suggested by the Consulate: "The undersigned ...........
son of .......... and of .......... , born at .......... on .......... , respectfully requests
exemption from Italian military service in conformity with Article XIII of the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the
Italian Republic signed on February 2, 1948, and entering into force on July 26, 1949,
because the undersigned acquires American citizenship by naturalization on ........ , at
.......... , certificate no .........
"The undersigned left the mother country for the United States on .......... , and Is
domiciled and resident in .............
130. See note 121 supra.
130a. But see Int. Rev. Code § 911 (1954).
131. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
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time of "all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation
or government ... who shall be within the United States and not ac-
tually naturalized." 132 Fortunately for the dual national, the Depart-
ment of Justice did not interpret this as authorizing the detention of
American citizens who also possess enemy citizenship.1
Difficult questions may arise as to the right of one of dual nationality
of the two hostile countries to the return of property seized by the
Alien Property Custodian under the authority of the Trading with the
Enemy Act." 4 It has been held that a native born American citizen,
stranded in Germany upon the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, and there-
after marrying a German citizen, thus acquiring German citizenship,
could, on her return to the United States, properly apply for and obtain
a return of her seized property since under the law of the United States,
she had continued to be a citizen thereof.1"5
However, it is interesting to note that under the same act, the term
"enemy" residing within enemy territory may include citizens of the
United States.136 Thus, a native born citizen of the United States, living
in Germany, could not for the reason of citizenship alone maintain an
action for the return of property from the Alien Property Custodian.137
The citizen must, in addition, show that the residence was not acquired
voluntarily and that it was not a permanent place of abode."
The same would seem applicable to a dual national who also possesses
the nationality of the enemy and that of a neutral or friendly State.
A naturalized American citizen born of German parents in Switzerland,
hence a dual national, who acted as agent of the German Government
after Germany and the United States were at war, was considered an
"enemy" or "ally of the enemy." His executor was consequently pre-
cluded from recovering the citizen's property seized in California.,"
Nor will mere declaration of intention to select the neutral nation-
ality remove the disability. Mere declaration of intention by German
nationals to assume the character or citizenship of Czechoslovakia was
insufficient as a substitute for removal, or bona fide intention to return
to that State. It was held proper for the courts of a belligerent nation
132. 50 U.S.CA. App. § 21 (1946).
133. Sen. Rep. No. 1496, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1942); 34 A.B.A.J. 321 (1948).
134. S0 U.S.C.A. App. § 1 (1951).
135. McGrath v. Zander, 177 F. 2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
136. Salvoni v. Pilson, 181 F. 2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 9S1
(1950); U.S. v. Krepper, 159 F. 2d 958 (3rd Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 US. 824 (1947).
137. Feyerabend v. McGrath, 189 F. 2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
138. Sarthou v. Clark 78 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. CaL 1948).
139. Ibid.
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to deny an individual the right to claim either nationality whenever it
may best suit his purpose.140
The greatest wartime hazard faced by the dual national is that of
refusing to assist the State in which he finds himself and be shot for
desertion, or to aid that State and be considered a traitor by the other
State of which he is also a national.
There is no doubt that anyone owing allegiance to the United States
may be guilty of treason for aiding the enemy in time of war.141 Who
are those considered to owe allegiance to the United States? They
include an American citizen domiciled in an enemy country, 42 and
even an enemy alien residing in enemy occupied American territory.1 48
Nor is this allegiance easily cast off. Revocation of an American pass-
port by a consular agent did not show loss of citizenship or dissolve an
individual's obligation of allegiance arising from that citizenship; 144
neither did loss of protection. 145 In another case, an American citizen
signed, before the war, a paper in the nature of .an oath or affirmation
of allegiance to Germany, and relied on this as bearing on the work in
which she was tried. Yet, she was declared to be still a citizen of the
United States, owing allegiance to her native land. 40
If the above individuals owe allegiance, and that allegiance is so diffi-
cult to shed, can this be less true with respect to the dual national? A
dual national of Japanese ancestry was convicted of treason by an
American court. In the course of instructing the jury, the trial judge
pointed out that "under our law an American citizen cannot owe 'per-
manent allegiance' to more than one country at any given time; that is
to say, it is legally impossible for any American citizen to owe conflict-
ing allegiance to any other country so long as he or she remains a citizen
of the United States." He added, however, that the law allows expa-
triation. This was not found to have resulted in the instant case even
though the dual national himself believed that by registering his name
140. Waldes v. Basch, 109 Misc. 306, 179 N.Y.S. 713 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd, 181
N.Y.S. 958 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1920).
141. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2381 (1951) provides "Whoever, owing allegiance to the United
States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and com-
fort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason. .. ."
142. Chandler v. United States, 171 F. 2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
918 (1949); Burgman v. United States, 188 F. 2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 838 (1951).
143. Office of the Judge Advocate of the Navy, Advance Copy Court-Martial Orders
No. 19, Sep. 8, 1948, at 4.
144. Gillars v. United States, 182 F. 2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
145. Burgman v. United States, 188 F. 2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
146. See note 144 supra.
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in the civil status registry in Japan he had renounced his allegiance
to the United States.147
A more sensible result was achieved in a court martial of a dual na-
tional by a-Belgian military tribunal. 48 The accused was held not
to have renounced Belgian nationality by the mere fact of having joined
the German Army, but the fact that he was regarded by the German
authorities as a German national, and his own belief that on joining
the German Army he renounced Belgian nationality, eliminated the
intent necessary to prove him guilty of treason. It is interesting to
note that though born in Germany, the accused had lived in Belgium
from early childhood until the time of the war, had tried to enlist in the
Belgian Army but was turned down, and finally ended up by joining the
notorious SS troops. In view of the latter fact, this decision is to be
commended for its unusual emotional restraint.
It is not unreasonable to conclude, from a study of the American
practice described, that the threat of treason is omnipresent in the case
of a dual national, especially in view of the emotive reaction evoked
by the very nature of treason.
Assuming that Joe, our dual national in case number one, enlisted
in the American Army in 1942 and fought on the Italian front, what
would be the consequences from the standpoint of Italian law?
To the Italian, bearing arms against the State is the gravest viola-
tion of the duty of allegiance.' The citizen who takes up arms against
the State, or serves in the armed forces of the enemy is punished by
life imprisonment. If he exercises a command function, he is sentenced
to death.
However, he is excused if he can show that he was obliged so to act
by the laws of the State in which he was present. As a volunteer, Joe
could not take advantage of this exculpatory provision. Further, the
fact that he may have lost his citizenship through renunciation would
not alter the situation, for the law specifically states that for the pur-
pose of this crime, anyone who has ever been a citizen, regardless of the
cause of loss, is punishable.'
Temporarily, the effect of this has been vitiated by Article 16 of the
Treaty of Peace between Italy and the Allied Powers, which expressly
provides that Italy will not indict nor prosecute any Italian citizen
147. Tomoya Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (192).
148. Von Berge Case, Military Tribunal Turnout, March 3, 1947 Pasicrise Beige III,
35 (1947); Lauterpacht, Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases,
Case no. 56 (1947).
149. Valentino, Codice Penale, Esposizone e Commento Pratico 243 (1949).
150. Italy: Codice Penale, art. 242 (Franchi, Feroci 1949).
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for the sole reason that he had expressed sympathy for, and had acted
in favor of, the Allied Powers from June 10, 1940 to the effective date
of the Treaty.151
The jurisdiction referred to herein included judicial and legislative
control, i.e., amenability to legal process, and civil and criminal lia-
bility for acts committed within and without the territorial limits. Al-
though it is unquestioned that the State may exercise this jurisdiction
with respect to nationals, it may not have done so. For this reason,
the municipal legislation of Italy and the United States will be cur-
sorily examined to determine generally to what personal jurisdiction
the national is subject. This assumes relevance for the dual national in-
asmuch as it is conceivable that compliance with the laws of both
States will be exacted from him.
In the United States, it is generally true that the physical presence
within the State is usually required for the American courts to assume
jurisdiction over an individual, whether national or alien, and that lia-
bility depends on the law of the locality in which the act took place.
The Congress of the United States has the power to regulate the
actions of the United States citizens outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States, regardless of whether the act involved occurred
within the territory of a foreign nation.152 This power has been exer-
cised so as to require a citizen abroad to return to the United States to
testify in a criminal case."" In upholding a conviction of contempt
based on ignoring a subpoena served upon the citizen in France, the
Supreme Court said, "With respect to the exercise of authority, there
is no question of international law, but solely of the purport of the
municipal law which establishes the duties of the citizen in relation to
his government." 54 Thus far, however, no attempt has been made by
the United States to confer personal jurisdiction over its citizens on the
courts so that these will be enabled to render valid in personam judg-
ments in ordinary civil cases.
. Unlike the United States practice, it is a principle of Italian law that
all the laws which regulate the legal status of the national in his rela-
tionships with his family and other persons, follow him wherever he may
go. 55 The alien sojourning in Italy remains subject to the laws of his
country. This is known as the nationality principle, and, in Italy, it is
151. U.S. Treaty Series No. 1648, art. 16 (Dep't State 1947); 1948 Glurlsprudenza
Italiana 1802 cites the Aug. 12, 1948 decision of the Court of Assizes at Genova
to that effect.
152. Vermilyea-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
153. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
154. Id. at 432.
155. 2 Fiore, Diritto Civile Italiano 21 (1893).
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based on the belief that "it would be an abdication of sovereignty if a
State renounced its right to govern its national who has emigrated;
conversely, it would be a violation of the sovereignty of the tnigr6's
nation if the receiving nation should apply to the migr6 laws not made
for him; finally, legal ties of the 6migr6 with his fatherland contribute
to his fidelity to national institutions." 30
The Italian legislator, in writing the new code of 1942, chose the na-
tionality theory to determine the law which governs an individual's
life.157 This is probably the rule in most civil law countres1 8
This principle is most often applied to the personal relations of the
individual. For example, personal relationships between spouses of
different citizenships are governed by the last national law which has
been theirs in communion, or, if there was no such common citizen-
ship, by the national law of the husband at the time of the celebra-
tion of the marriage. 9 As a result, a French court was held competent
by an Italian tribunal to determine a French husband's request for
divorce because, though the marriage was performed in Italy, it was a
controversy between French citizens, the wife having acquired French
citizenship by marriage.'
The relationship between parents and children are governed by the na-
tional law of the father, or by the national law of the mother if only
maternity is ascertained, or if only the mother has legitimized the child.
Relationships between adopting parents and adopted children are gov-
erned by the national law of the adopting parent at the time of adop-
tion.' 6' Thus, it was not only held that the adoption of a French minor
by an Italian citizen was regulated by the municipal law of the adop-
ter, 62 but an Italian court gave no efficacy to an adoption contract en-
tered into in Switzerland by Italian citizens and authorized by a Swiss
judge.16 3 In another adoption case, the dual nationality, Italo-American,
of the adopter was held not an obstacle to adoption where either of
156. McCusker, Italian Conflict of Laws, 25 Tulane L. Rev. 70, 72 (1950).
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid.
159. Italy: Codice Civile, Disposizioni sulla Legge in Generale, art. 19 (Frandi,
Ferod 1949).
160. Crovetto v. Guillemin, Court of Appeals Genova, Aug. 26, 1948, 72 Foro Itallano
1084 (1949).
161. See note 159 supra, art. 20.
162. , Court of Appeals Firenze, June 12, 1950, 1950 Giurisprudenza Toscana
171; 73 Foro Italiano 27, note 6 (1950).
163. - , Court of Appeals Milano, Feb. 6, 1950, cited in 73 Foro Itallano 27,
note 7 (1950).
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the municipal laws consented to an adoption.0 4 In this instance dual
nationality may have been a benefit.
To show the extent of this nationality principle, gifts are regulated
by the law of the donor; so are successions.60 Even contractual obliga-
tions may be if both parties are of the same nationality.1
The conflict of the two principles, i.e., nationality and physical pres-
ence, assumes importance in a third State when that State is called
upon to determine the nationality status of a dual national so that a
particular law may be applied, and must also be considered with re-
spect to civil matters. In such cases, account is usually taken by the
third State of all the "individual's relations to the State whose nation-
ality is in question: of the degree of his attachment to that State as it
may be concluded from his condition of life, from spiritual as well as
material circumstances, such as loyalty and interests on the one hand,
residence on the other."'M6 This means that in third States the dual na-
tional is deemed to possess the nationality of that State with which he
is in fact most closely connected.
Would the United States, as the third State, make use of this prin-
ciple, i.e., effective nationality, in applying a statute requiring a deter-
mination of the individual's nationality status? For example, the Refu-
gee Relief Act of 1953 11a provides, inter alia, for the adjustment of non-
immigrant status of certain aliens within the United States to a status
as permanent immigrants. The essential requirement is that the appli-
cant be unable, for fear of persecution, to return to the country of his
birth, nationality or last residence. Assume that the applicant is a na-
tional of both Great Britain, with which he has had no connection, and
of China, with which he is in fact most closely associated, and that he
can show that he is unable to return to China for fear of persecution
though he can be sent to Great Britain. Is he entitled to relief under
the Act? The answer depends on the construction of the word "nation-
ality."
If "nationality" is construed to mean all the nationalities the indi-
vidual possesses, he is not eligible; if it is construed to embody the prin-
ciple of effective nationality, he is. The first alternative emphasizes
the unenviable position of the dual national and the importance of solv-
ing the dual nationality problem; the second alternative represents the
164. Daniele v. Venezia, Court of Appeals Napoli, Jan. 13, 1949, 1949 Giurisprudenza
Italiano I, 2, 428.
165. See note 159 supra, art. 24.
166. Id. art. 23.
167. Id. art. 25.
168. 89 Sol. J. 205, 206 (1945).
168a. 67 Stat. 400, § 6.
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solution suggested in similar situations by all civilized states and which
this year was recommended by the United Nations to all its members
as the solution least open to objections and which "would facilitate
equitable decisions."116sb In addition, in this particular instance, appli-
cation of the principle of effective nationality is in accord with the reme-
dial natures c of the statute and with legislative antagonism 6' towards
dual nationality.
The competence of the State to prosecute and punish its nationals
on the sole basis of their nationality is conceded. 1 9 By virtue of such
jurisdiction, the State is enabled to prosecute its nationals for acts done
abroad and to execute judgments upon their property within the State,
or upon them personally when they return. The Constitution of the
United States does not forbid the application of criminal laws to acts
committed by its citizens abroad.' However, the United States has,
in general, exercised limited jurisdiction over the national for such
crimes. Only those crimes affecting the Government,' 7 ' or murder com-
mitted on a ship'72 or plane flying the American flag are punishable in
an American court.
Once again, in contrast to the American practice, the general rule in
Italian law is that crimes committed abroad are punishable. These
crimes are of two kinds, those that are possible of commission only by
the citizen, and those both by the citizen and the alien. Among the
latter are included crimes against the personality of the State, counter-
feiting and using the seal of the State, counterfeiting legal tender,
crimes committed by a public official in the service of the State, and
every other crime punishable by international law.17 3 Also punishable
are political crimes committed abroad. 74 By political crimes are meant
those which offend the political interests of the State or a political right
of a citizen, similar to our offenses against civil rights. 7"
As mentioned, for the majority of crimes against the State, it is not
168b. Survey of the Problem of Multiple Nationality Prepared by the Secretariat for
the International Law Commission. U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/84. 14 May 1954. Par. 232, p. 91.
168c. A similar statute, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, was considered remedial
in the Case of 3.L., File No. A 6662089, 1949 Interpreter Releases 236.
16d. It was and still is the intention of Congress that the plague of dual nationality
be eliminated to every degree possible." Gaudio v. Dulles, 110 F. Supp. 706, 709
(D.C.D.C. 1953).
169. Harvard Research, jurisdiction Over Crime, art. S (1929).
170. See note 144 supra.
171. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
172. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
173. Italy: Codice Penale, art. 7 (Franchi, Ferod 1949).
174. Id. arL 8.
179. Id. art. 294.
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necessary that the criminal be a citizen. However, citizenship is required
in the following crimes: bearing arms against the State; 170 corruption
of a citizen by a stranger; 17" trading with the enemy (here the resident
alien is also included) ; 178 activity against Italian nationality by the citi-
zen abroad; 179 accepting honors from an enemy State.180 It is believed
that "citizens" in these cases includes those who have lost their citi-
zenship for whatever cause.1 8
For ordinary crimes, only citizens may be punished if the crime is
committed abroad." 2 A serious crime, i.e., one which is punishable by
death, life imprisonment or a sentence of not less than three years, is
punishable in accordance with the Italian law covering the crime. If
it is merely an offense, there is the further requirement that it be pun-
ished at the request of the Minister of Justice or on the complaint of
the person injured.
Oddly enough, an individual's dual nationality was used against him
to make him liable for a crime he couldn't otherwise have committed
as a national of the State trying him. An Italian citizen who had opted
for German citizenship and served in the German Army was accused
of mistreating Italian prisoners of war, a crime for which he could not
have been guilty as an Italian. The military court rejected the defense
of Italian citizenship, stating that as the accused was a German national,
he could be tried, notwithstanding his possible Italian citizenship 88
In our conclusion on criminal jurisdiction, it must be noted that the
nationality principle is so predominant in Italian law that, in opposi-
tion to American practice, the Italian national may be tried in absentia
for his crimes.' 84
The State's Duty Towards the National
Nationality is the all important criterion in presenting a State claim.
Generally, it is the right of every sovereign State to protect its national
who is injured, contrary to international law, by the acts of another
176. Id. art. 242.
177. Id. art. 246.
178. Id. art. 250.
179. Id. art. 269.
180. Id. art. 275.
181. Manzini, Gabrieli and Cosentino, Codice Penale Illustrato Con I Lavori Prepara-
tori 217 (2d Ed. 1947).
182. Italy: Codice Penale, art. 9, (Franchi, Feroci, 1949).
183. Webbofer Case, Supreme Military Tribunal, May 30, 1947, 1948 Giustrlzia Penale
II, 375, with a note by Galasso, La Legge Penale di Guerra e la Perdita della Citta-
dinanza Italiana.
184. "Trial of Lo Dolce and Icardi in Absentia is Considered" N.Y. Times, Aug, 13,
1952, p. 3, col. 8.
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State, and is unable to obtain satisfaction through municipal law reme-
dies.' In taking up the case "by resorting to diplomatic action or in-
ternational judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality assert-
ing its own right, the right to ensure in the person of its nationals
respect for the rules of international law."' 80
Assuming that Joe, our hypothetical dual national, is injured by an
act of the German State, there seems to be no reason why either the
United States or Italy could not present a claim. So long as Joe is not
also considered a national by the State proceeded against, Germany,
each of the two States can take up his case.
A case of this kind is the William McKenzie Clain between Germany
and the United States brought before the Mixed Claims Commission
established between these two countries under a treaty of 1922.187 The
individual concerned possessed the nationality of the United States,
having been born therein, and that of Britain, by reason of his English
parentage. To defeat this claim, the German agent did not allege the
possession of dual nationality, but he did contend that the national,
after attaining his majority, had continually resided in England and
Canada, and that this amounted to an election of British nationality and
to a renunciation and forfeiture of United States nationality.
The Commission correctly stated that the doctrine of election was
not the law in the United States, and added that this international tri-
bunal was not competent "to consider what the municipal law of the
United States with respect to its citizenship should be, but only to find
and declare the law as it is, to the extent necessary to determine the
jurisdiction of this Commission and the liability of Germany under the
Treaty of Berlin."'188 It was accordingly found that the individual was
still an American national and that Germany was liable.
More complicated is the position when the individual possessed of
dual nationality is the object of a dispute between the two States claim-
ing him as a national.
In the Canevaro Case (1912)89 between Italy and Peru, the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration was faced with this problem. Canevaro
was born on Peruvian territory and therefore, according to Peruvian
law, was a Peruvian by birth; as he was born of an Italian father,
under Italian law he was considered an Italian by birth. The Court
pointed out that "Rafael Canevaro has on several occasions acted as a
185. Mlavrommatis Palestine Concessions, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 2 (1924) 12.
186. Panezevys-Saldutiskis Railway, P.CJJ., Ser. A/B No. 75 (1939) 16.
187. 20 Am. J. Int. L. 595 (1926).
188. Id. at 597.
189. Canevaro Case, Scott, Hague Court Reports 285, 287 (1916).
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Peruvian citizen, both by running as a candidate for the Senate, where
none are admitted except Peruvian citizens ...and, particularly, by
accepting the office of Counsel General for the Netherlands, after hav-
ing secured the authorization of both the Peruvian Government and
the Peruvian Congress.... Under these circumstances, whatever Rafael
Canevaro's status as a national may be in Italy, the Government of
Peru has a right to consider him a Peruvian citizen and to deny his
status as an Italian claimant." 10
This decision has been interpreted to mean that the Court did not
accept the view, amounting to a denial of justice, that, in such a case,
neither of the two countries could exercise its diplomatic protection
over the individual concerned, but applied the reasonable test of active
or overriding nationality.19'
In support of this interpretation there may be cited several decisions
of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals established under the Peace Treaties
of 1919. The case-of George S. Hein v. Hildesheimer Bank, decided by
the British-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is of special interest. The
claimant was born in Germany. By naturalization he became a British
subject, but his naturalization certificate contained an express reserva-
tion to the effect that within the limits of the foreign country of his
State of origin, the holder of the certificate was not to be deemed a
British subject. Under German law, Hein remained a German national.
Despite these facts, the Tribunal held: "The creditor has become a Brit-
ish national, and, as -he was residing in Great Britain on January 10th,
1920, he has acquired the right to claim under Article 296 (of the
Peace Treaty of Versailles) through the British Clearing Office."" 2
In the Mathison Case, the claimant against the Venezuelan Govern-
ment was born in Venezuela, had always lived there, and resided
therein at the time of the claim. His father was a British subject;
hence the claimant was a dual national. It was admitted that if the
claimant was a Venezuelan by the laws of Venezuela, then the law of
the domicile prevailed and the claimant had no standing before the
Mixed Commission. The umpire so found him to be, saying, in curious
language, that "Mathison is a Venezuelan and not a British subject, and
this tribunal has no jurisdiction over his laim."'91
In the Tellech Case, a claimant born in the United States of Austrian
parents, hence a dual national, went to Austria at the age of five to
reside. He was impressed into Austrian military service despite his
190. Id. at 287.
191. Schwarzenberger, op. cit. supra note 32, at 164.
192. See note 45 supra.
193. British-Venezuelan Arbitration, 1903; Ralston's Report 429.
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protestations and those of the United States, and subsequently suffered
injury thereby. In denying his claim against Austria, the Claims Com-
mission said, "The action taken by the Austrian civil authorities in the
exercise of their police power... was taken in Austria, where claimant
was voluntarily residing, against claimant as an Austrian citizen. ...
Possessing as he did dual nationality, he voluntarily took the risk
incident to residing in Austrian territory and subjecting himself to the
duties and obligations of an Austrian citizen aising under the municipal
laws of Austria."'194
From these decisions it is not clear whether the claim is rejected be-
cause the claimant has elected the nationality of the respondent State
or because he is most closely identified with that State. Nor do they
clearly indicate that a claim may never be brought on behalf of a dual
national by either State of which he is a national against the other State
of which he is also a national. However, instances may be presented to
show that this type of claim may not be brought.
For example, it is the policy of the United States not to present such
a claim. In connection with two individuals who wished to have their
claim against the Dominican Republic espoused by the United States,
the department of State took the position that since the two claimants
had the nationality of the Dominican Republic as well as the nation-
ality of the United States, it could not espouse their claim.le '
A more forceful, though older, decision may be cited. The case of
Alexander v. United States, before the American and British Claims
Commission under the Treaty of Washington of 1871, was an action for
damages to real property in Kentucky by the Union forces during the
Civil War. The national concerned was born in Kentucky of British
parents, had lived both in Kentucky and in Scotland and had died in
Kentucky. He was clearly a dual national. The claim was rejected, the
Commission stating:
"The practice of nations in such cases is believed to be for their sovereign to
leave the person who has embarrassed himself by assuming a double allegiance to
the protection which he may find provided for him by the municipal laws of that
other sovereign to whom he thus also owes allegiance. To treat his grievances against
that other sovereign as subjects of international concern would be to claim a juris-
diction paramount to that of the other nation of which he is also a subject. Com-
plications would inevitably result, for no government would recognize the right of
another to interfere thus in behalf of one whom it regarded as a subject of its
owfn2 1 9 6
194. Tripartite Claims Commission, 1928; Decisions of Tripartite Claims Commis-
sion 71.
195. 3 Hackworth, op. dt. supra note 9, at 354.
196. 3 Moore, International Arbitrations 2529, 2531 (1898).
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An occasional case may be found to the contrary, such as Arata
(Italy) v. Peru, where a claim was allowed on behalf of native born
Peruvians, children of an Italian national, who were citizens of both
States. The arbitrator said that in such circumfistances the courts of
each of the two States would apply its own law, but that an arbitral
tribunal will decide according to the principles of international law.
Among these principles, he added, was that the legitimate child acquires
at birth the nationality which the father then possesses, so the claim
by Italy was sustained.'97
The conflict in cases leads to the conclusion that since most claims
are brought under specific treaty provisions or arbitration agreements,
it is important to realize that the controlling factor is often the word-
ing of the agreement rather than the dual nationality of the person in-
jured. This agreement establishes the jurisdiction of the Claims Com-
mission, hence no clear conclusion can be deduced from it with regard
to the effect of dual nationality on the outcome of the claim. In the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, the rule at present seems to
be that a dual national may not have his claim espoused by either
State against the other.
Another function of nationality in the international sphere is evi-
denced by the State's duty to protect its national and his property
when both are abroad.19 It thus seems that the dual national may be
protected by either State claiming him.
The Department of State, however, uses its discretion and will not
grant diplomatic protection to an American so long as he has his resi-
dence in, and is most closely connected with, that State which has also
conferred its nationality upon him. During the Spanish Civil War in
1937, the consular offices were instructed that "protection should not
be extended to persons having both Spanish and American nationalities
unless such persons habitually reside in the United States, are in fact
most closely connected with this country and are in Spain only tem-
porarily. Doubtful cases should be fully reported to Department."1 9
An instance in which the third State tried to dispute such protection
of a dual national arose during the First World War, prior to the entry
of America into that war. Germany attempted to mistreat an indi-
vidual, who was a national of both England and the United States, on
197. Descamps and Renault, Recuell International des Traites du XXe Slecle 709
(1901). See also Chopin (France v. United States) before the commission under the con-
vention of 1880; 3 Moore, International Arbitrations 2506 (1898).
198. 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 8, at 588.
199. Secretary HuH to all American consular offices in Spain except Vigo, Dec. 21, 1937,
Ms. Dep't State, file 352.11/271 A, quoted in 3 Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 5, at 354.
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the ground that he was an enemy national. The Foreign Office assert-
ed in its note that "in accordance with the general principles of inter-
national law, an enemy alien possessing a neutral nationality at the
same time, can be treated as a person of enemy nationality, and no re-
gard need be paid to his neutral nationality." It added that there was
no cause for complaint in the individual's detention and expulsion by
the German authorities. The Department of State rejected this sweep-
ing contention, replying as follows:
".... it may be said that Highsmith was born of American parents, that he claims
to have a domicile in the United States, and that the United States Government
has recognized his American citizenship and has presented him with a passport. In
view of these facts, the United States Government does not recognize the right
in the German Government to set up an adverse claim to Highsmith's citizenship
on behalf of Great Britain.1200
In addition to espousing claims and protecting its national abroad, a
State also has the duty of receiving on its territory such of its nationals
who are not allowed to remain on the territory of other States. 01 Since
no State is obliged by international law to allow foreigners to remain
within its boundaries, it may, for many reasons, happen that certain
individuals are expelled from foreign countries. The home State of the
expelled persons cannot refuse to receive them on the home territory,
the expelling State having a right to insist upon this. In former times
it was the practice for States to banish nationals whom they considered
undesirable for political reasons. A State of which the banished person
is not and never was a national may refuse to receive such person,202
but if the banished person gains admission to the territory of another
State, the latter may deport him to the State from which he is banished.
20 3
Hence, a dual national has greater possibility of finding a home than
the person with a single nationality.
HI. TowARDS A SOLUTION To DuAL NATIONALITY
Evaluation of The Dual National's Status
This concluding chapter will first evaluate dual nationality, discuss-
ing its advantages and disadvantages. It will then outline the proposals
designed to eliminate its creation or to divest the individual of one na-
tionality, and the efforts to alleviate certain specific areas of friction.
It will end with a list of recommendations by the writer.
The existence of dual nationality may have some advantages for the
200. 3 Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 5, at 355.
201. 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 8, at 588.
202. Bouve, Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens c. 1 (1912).
203. Harvard Research, Draft Convention on Nationality, art. 20 (1929).
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individual concerned. Within certain limitations, a dual national may
select which of the two nationalities he will assume and take advantage
of, something which the ordinary national may not do. Because of his
dual nationality, it is conceivable that this individual may benefit from
those same municipal laws which can impose undue burdens upon him.
It is not necessarily true that a dual national wishes to discard one
of his nationalities. So long as he does not feel its ill effects, there is
no reason for him to do so. In many instances the dual national has
ties with both States, and he often finds it necessary to leave the State
in which he has his habitual residence to visit the other State of which
he is also a national in order to attend to family matters, or to study,
or to carry on an intercountry business, or for other purposes. He may
be loath to sever relations, particularly the tie of allegiance, with either
country, and in the absence of the onerous facets of dual nationality,
he is content to maintain the status quo.
The above is especially true of the individual who becomes a dual
national through naturalization, direct or derivative. Some of those
directly naturalized become nationals for practical purposes, and con-
tinue to think of themselves, in spirit, as owing allegiance to their coun-
try of origin rather than to their country of adoption. For them dual
nationality is not unpleasant, for it enables them conveniently to shift
the emphasis on their allegiance to suit their purpose. An example of
this was the attitude of many Italo-Americans who felt themselves
strongly Italian during the 1930s when the Italian star was in the
ascendance, and who solemnly adhered to their American allegiance in
the later years when the star waned.
These advantages, however, are for very few individuals. Most dual
nationals have strong, steadfast preference for one state, and for them
the disadvantages of dual nationality outweigh the dubious advantages.
We have already seen what burdens may be placed on the dual na-
tional. To recapitulate, he may be required to serve in the military
forces of two States, to face double taxation, to incur twice the un-
enviable risk of treason because of his unique position. In addition,
he is subject to the judicial and legislative jurisdiction of two States,
and he is legally answerable to both of them for his private affairs and
for his criminal actions. In the realm of international affairs, he is
unable to have a claim presented in his behalf against either of the
States of which he is a national, and this often imposes a pecuniary, if
not physical, hardship upon him. Further, he may legally be deprived
of protection if he is within the territory of a State claiming him as a
national. If dual nationality has not been his deliberate choice, it seems
equitable that some relief should be provided.
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The existence of dual nationality may cause friction between the
claiming States, and this sometimes results in the impairment of friend-
ly relations between those same States. The situation then becomes a
matter of vital concern to the international community, and, for this
reason, in addition to the personal discomfiture of the individual, a
solution is mandatory.
This was recognized by the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Ques-
tions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws when it stated in its
preamble that it was in the "general interest of the international com-
munity to secure that all its members should recognize that every person
should have a nationality and should have one nationality only." The
ideal towards which the Hague Convention aimed was "the abolition
of all cases, both of statelessness and of double nationality." It none-
theless realized that the question of nationality was a political question,
and came to the conclusion that "under the economic and social condi-
tions which at present exist in the various countries, it is not possible
to reach immediately a uniform solution. 204 In this respect the situa-
tion has not changed. This has not, however, prevented efforts seek-
ing either the elimination of the entire problem of dual nationality, or
the amelioration of some of the particular areas of friction.
Elimination of Dual Nationality
Inevitably, dual nationality will continue to exist unless all the States
agree to adopt a uniform rule for nationality at birth, and a rule as to the
effect of naturalization, thus doing away with the cause of the prob-
lem in conflicting legislation.
Under present nationality legislation only two principles, jus soli and
jus sanguinis, are used in determining nationality at birth. Because of
the equal attachment by the States of the world to these two rules, it is
unlikely that in the foreseeable future either of them will be adopted
by all States to the exclusion of the other. Though each of the principles
has been acclaimed the better, 05 there is little to choose between them.
Universal adoption of either would certainly eliminate dual nationality
arising at birth, but neither subsequent dual nationality nor other diffi-
204. League of Nations, V. Legal, supra note 40, preamble.
205. Favoring jus sanguinis as opposed to de Lapradelle, op. cit. supra note 11, see
Scott, Nationality: Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis, 24 Am. J. Int. L. 59 (1930) who states: "The
principle of birth within a country conferring its nationality is a natural principle, be-
cause resulting from birth, itself a natural process, and applying alike to all persons
born in the country, without reference to the nationality of their parents. It is an objec-
tive principle; it is relentless, and without a remnant of consent on the part of the
person born. It is universal, as law should be, making the test one of fact; that of birth
within the country in question."
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culties would disappear. For instance, if jus soli is adopted, it would
be manifestly unfair to impose nationality on transient individuals be-
longing in every respect, except that of accidental birth, to another
State; if jus sanguinis prevails, nationality may be equally unrealistically
imposed on individuals who are residing in, most closely connected
with, and partaking of the community life of, a foreign State. Addi-
tional provisions would have to be made to obviate such undesirable
results.
A compromise was suggested by Vattel. After expressing the opinion
that "by the law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their
fathers" with regard to nationality, he adds, "But I suppose that the
father has not entirely quitted his country in order to settle elsewhere.
If he has fixed abode in a foreign country, he has become a member
of another society, at least as a perpetual inhabitant, and children will
be members of it also. 206
Though Vattel's compromise suggestion is a good one and is, per-
haps, the most suitable for conferring nationality at birth, any rule,
whether it be based on jus sanguinis, jus soli, a mixture of both, domi-
cile or residence of the parents, etc., would result in the elimination of
dual nationality at birth if it were adopted by all States. To prevent
dual nationality from arising at birth, the most important consideration
is the universal acceptance of a uniform rule, and not its quality or
merits.
Dual nationality arising subsequent to birth may be eliminated by
the adherence of the States to the principle that naturalization divests
an individual of his original nationality. In order to avoid confusion,
however, certain limitations should be imposed on conferring nationality
by naturalization. Each State should refrain from naturalizing an alien
who has his habitual residence within the territory of another State, 07
and it should not naturalize an individual without his consent."
Neither of these restrictions is applicable to derivative naturalization.
To prevent the creation of dual nationality for married women, the
States must universally recognize either the traditional principle that
the condition of the wife follows that of her husband, or the modern
one, evidencing the strong trend towards emancipation of women, that
the married woman keeps her own status. In view of the equal dis-
semination of both principles, the adoption of either is unlikely at the
present time.
As has already been stated, there is little objection to the existence
206. Vattel, Law of Nations 102 (Chitty's ed. 1849).
207. Harvard Research, Draft Convention on Nationality, art. 14 (1929).
208. Id. art. 15.
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of dual nationality in the minor. The only concern is with his being
able to divest himself of one nationality when he comes of age.
The suggestions made above are not necessarily complete and exclu-
sive. Others undoubtedly may be made. It is important only that
the nations of the world agree on one rule for the conferring of nation-
ality at birth and through naturalization, no matter what form it takes,
in order to eliminate dual nationality.
In the event that a compromise rule for conferring nationality at
birth does not prevail, Flournoy suggests a uniform rule of election
following minority to be adopted only by international convention, sup-
plemented by uniform legislation in the several States.- 9 Rather than
permit choice by the individual, he proposed that election be based
on facts, specifically, the domicile of the dual national on attaining
majority. Domicile is not explained, but Flournoy admits that it would
have to be arbitrarily defined before this test could be applied.2 10
When this suggestion was made, Flournoy was not concerned with dual
nationality arising through naturalization because it was the unwaver-
ing position of the United States that dual nationality could not result
from naturalization inasmuch as the voluntary act divested the per-
son of his nationality of origin. It seems, however, that this proposal
could be put to use in both cases of dual nationality, i.e., that acquired
at birth, and that acquired subsequently.
The same solution, with the use of the term "habitual residence -211
in place of "domicile," was advocated by the Harvard Research in Inter-
national Law, Draft Convention on Nationality, which proposed in Ar-
ticle 12 that:
"A person who has at birth the nationality of two or more states shall, upon his
attaining the age of twenty-three years, retain the nationality only of that one of
those states in the territory of which he has his habitual residence; if at that time
his habitual residence is in the territory of a State of which he is not a national,
such person shall retain the nationality of that one of those states of which he is a
national within the territory of which he last had his habitual residence."
The dual nationality of the married woman, in the event she acquired
a second nationality through her marriage, might be terminated by
requiring her to make a choice within a certain period of time after the
marriage, say two years. Divorce should not divest her of her remain-
ing nationality, and in the event that she returned to her State of origin
209. Flournoy, Dual Nationality and Election, 30 Yale L. J. 693, 705-709 (1921).
210. Id. at 708.
211. Since Flournoy was the Reporter for the Harvard Research, Draft Convention
on Nationality, it may be that he meant habitual residence as defined by that convention
when he spoke of domicile.
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and wished to reacquire her original nationality, provision might be
made for her expeditious naturalization which would divest her of her
unwanted nationality. A child acquiring dual nationality through the
naturalization of his parents should also have to make a compulsory
election within two years after coming of age.
For these situations the Hague Codification Conference provided that
if a person, without any voluntary act of his own, possesses dual na-
tionality, he may renounce one of them with the permission of the
State whose nationality he wishes to surrender, but that, subject to the
laws of the State concerned, such permission shall not be refused if
that person has his habitual residence abroad.212
The emphasis on domicile or residence has been prevalent in all pro-
posals made for the solution of nationality problems. A distinguished
English lawyer and author has suggested that those "who are perma-
nently settled in its territory with no definite intention of departing
therefrom be treated as nationals of such State."218 "A year's residence
would not be too much to exact." 214
Wigmore states that "citizenship should be identified with domicile
(or residence, as distinguished from place of nativity or parental na-
tionality); i.e., it should be territorialized or localized, ' 21' both with re-
spect to the State's rights over its citizens and the State's rights vis-h-vis
another State. For him, citizenship would be "compulsory," and he
would require the new resident to elect within two years of his arrival
into the State.216 This two year's residence should be enough to entitle
the individual to citizenship, and such citizenship would necessarily be
"cexclusive and single." He is not clear as to whether he would substi-
tute domicile for nationality or merely base nationality on domicile, but
in any event, "Every resident domiciled in the United States becomes a
citizen.-2 1
7
There are others who are of the opinion that it is no "unreasonable
guess that domicile rather than birthplace or filiation may in the fu-
ture be the favorite fact of attachment for the acquisition of nationali-
212. League of Nations, V. Legal (1930), Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, art. 6.
213. Baty, The Interconnection of Nationality and Domicile, 13 Ill. L. Rev. 363, 373
(1919).
214. Id. at 374.
215. Wigmore, Domicile, Double Allegiance, and World Citizenship, 21 Ill. L. Rev.
761, 762 (1927).
216. Id. at 763 states: "If he elects not to do so, then he must go back to his own
country. He cannot live here and obtain protection and a livelihood from our resources,
and yet not share the burdens of citizenship."
217. Id. at 764.
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ty. 21S Flournoy, however, rejects domicile as the basis of nationality,
stating that "because of its vagueness and uncertainty, it would lead
to more confusion than the present clash of nationality laws.) 210 As
Cheshire says, "Nationality and domicile are two different conceptions,
and a man may change his domicile without divesting himself of his
nationality. 'A change of domicile is not a condition of naturalization,
and naturalization does not necessarily involve a change of domi-
cile'."22° Flournoy's view is supported by many conflicts of law cases
in American courts.2 2' Lending further support to his contention is
the practical problem, at least in the United States, of overcoming the
Constitutional embodiment of the rule of jzs soli as a basis for confer-
ring nationality at birth.
So long as constitutional prohibitions exist, and the international com-
munityis not organized in a federal system in which each State is sub-
ject to federal authority and each individual possessed of dual citi-
zenship, i.e., that of the State in which he resides and that of the world
community, it is unlikely that the rule of nationality based on domi-
cile will be adopted. Should such an international federal system, pat-
terned after the one in use in the United States, be established, domicile
might well play the same role in international affairs that it now does
in interstate matters within the United States. It may then serve the
function of conferring an additional citizenship, that of the State in a
world union, to an individual who already possesses the federal, or
world, citizenship. Mere change of domicile and meeting residence re-
quirements in another State will result in loss of one citizenship and the
acquisition of another. Citizenship thus becomes important only as a
means for obtaining certain political and judicial rights. The term
"nationality" may then become juridically insignificant and be reserved
for use only with respect to the racial, linguistic, or cultural origin of an
individual.
Amelioration of Specific Difficidties
Regardless of the eventual success of the adoption of universal rules,
efforts.have been made, and should continue to be made, to avoid cer-
tain specific areas of friction, e.g., military service, determination of
which nationality is to be given effect in a third State, protection abroad
218. Koessler, "Subject" "Citizen," "National," and "Permanent Allegiance," S6 Yale
L. J. 58, 76 (1946).
219. Flournoy, op. cit. supra note 209, at 70S.
220. Cheshire, Private International Law 176 (2d ed. 1938).
221. In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268 (Prerog. Ct. 1934), af'd men., Dor-
rance v. Thayer Martin, 13 N.J. Misc. 168 (Prerog. Ct. 1935), cert. denied, 298 US. 678
(1936).
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and the espousal of a national's claim,222 and the need for expatriation
permits from the country of origin.
Certainly, it is unreasonable that a person should be subject to equal
claims by two States to his military services as a national, and for this
reason the Draft Convention on Nationality proposed that "a person
who has the nationality of two or more States shall not be subject to
the obligation of military or other national service in one of these States
while he has his habitual residence in the territory of another of these
States." 223
In a Special Protocol Relating to Military Obligations in 'Certain
Cases of Double Nationality, signed or ratified among others, by the
United States, Great Britain and Brazil, it was agreed that if a person
of two or more nationalities possesses the effective224 nationality of
one country, he shall be exempted from all military obligations in the
other country or countries subject to the possible loss of nationality
in those countries. Further, if a minor could, on coming of age, renounce
the nationality of a State, he is exempt, during his minority, from mili-
tary service in that State, and if under the law of the State he loses
its nationality when he has acquired another, he is exempted from mili-
tary obligations in the State whose nationality he has lost.225
In addition, some States have concluded bilateral agreements con-
cerning military service in cases of persons having the nationality of
two or more States.2 26 These treaties usually provide that a person who
has done military service in a country of which he is a national shall
be exempt from the requirement of military service in the other coun-
try of which he is a national.
The question often arises as to which of the nationalities possessed
by the individual the third State should give effect to. The types of
situations envisioned are these: if war breaks out between two States,
and nationals of the enemy State are deported, may the deporting State
also deport one who is a national of a third State as well as of the enemy
State? If goods of a dual national, one of whose nationalities is that of
the enemy States, are. seized on ships at sea, are they to be returned?
If a certain nationality is excluded from a State, may a State exclude
222. Even in these cases it is to be noted that residence has played an important part.
223. Harvard Research, Draft Convention on Nationality, art. 11 (1929).
224. Effective nationality represents the taking into account of all the relations of
the person concerned to the State whose nationality is in question, i.e., of the degree of
his attachment as it may be concluded from his conditions of life, from spiritual as well
as material circumstances, such as loyalty and interests on the one hand, residence on the
other.
225. 24 Am. J. Int. L. Supp. 201 (1930.
226. Harvard Research, supra note 223, art. 40.
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an individual who is also a national of an admitted nationality? If
extradition of a dual national is sought, must the third State ever com-
ply? If so, when?
The Hague Codification Conference attempted to solve these ques-
tions by providing that if a person has more than one nationality, he
shall, within a third State, be treated as if he had only one. In particu-
lar, it is laid down that the third State shall recognize exclusively either
the nationality of the State in which he is habitually and principally
resident, or the nationality of the State with which he appears in fact to
be most closely connected. The convention thus gives effect to the prin-
ciple of effective nationality.22 7
This principle has been defined many times, most recently by the
special reporter to the International Law Commission of the United
Nations who said:
"To determine the effective nationality account will be taken of the following
circumstances, either jointly or separately;
a. Residence in the territory of one of the States of which the individual concerned
is a national, for a period of not less than fifteen years;
b. Knowledge of the language of the State of residence;
c. Ownership of immovable property in State of residence. '27a
The use of habitual residence as a test of the nationality to be given
effect by a third State has been objected to. A reason given is that it
does not take the individual himself into consideration. He may have
chosen his residence within a State for reasons of health or money, and
this may not necessarily indicate his true allegiance. The only feasible
solution, according to this view, would be the free choice of the person
concerned. As expressed by its proponent:
"This solution of choice is . . . the common denominator of all other solutions;
because habitual choice, habitual residence, or the nationality last acquired, etc., all
contain more or less the idea underlying the choice of the person concerned. In-
stead of adopting, however, what I might call a presumptive choice, instead of
setting up arbitrary rules to decide what a person's choice should be, why not let
him have his free choice, his declared choice?" 228
This solution does not seem feasible in view of the inherent possibili-
ties for fraudulent practices on the part of the person who is allowed
to choose his nationality in a third State.
The rule of habitual residence has also been advocated as a solu-
tion to injustices arising from failure to protect nationals abroad and to
227. See note 225 supra.
227a. U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/83, 22 April 1954.
228. League of Nations, V. Legal, Acts of the Conference for Codification of Inter-
national Law, Meetings of the Committees, Vol. II, Minutes of the First Committee 63.
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espouse their claims.220 Under this view, the only State which could pro-
tect the dual national or espouse his claim would be that State with
which he is most closely connected. However, a simpler solution has
been proposed. Assuming there is sufficient development in international
law in the near future so that there is adopted a binding international
bill of rights, whereby the individual is given a right, when he is mal-
treated, to appear in his own behalf before an international tribunal,
this problem will be greatly alleviated. As stated by an authority on
the subject:
"Assuming the acceptance of the hypothesis that the right to fair treatment is
a right of the individual and not merely of a State with which he is connected, the
cases of dual nationality offer an illuminating picture of the change that would
take place in international law. If X is a national of both States, A and B, and
is mistreated in B, A could make legal representations on his behalf and B could
not offer as a defense that X was at the same time its national, since B would
owe a duty to X, not as a national of A, but as an individual. Granted appropriate
procedural developments in international relations, such as the establishment of
special claims commissions to which the individual would have the right of direct
access, X himself could present his claim and the question of nationality would
clearly become irrelevant and immaterial.1' 280
The problem will continue to exist, however, until as a corollary to
allowing the individual to present a claim in his own behalf, the State
is prevented from asserting its right "to ensure in the persons of its
nationals respect for the rules of international law."28 1 This right is
in reality based on the injury to the individual, and if the individual
can obtain proper redress, there seenis to be no sufficient basis for
the State's right.
To minimize friction arising as a result of naturalization it has been
suggested that the naturalizing State require the prospective national
to secure an expatriation permit from the country of origin.28 2 If this
is refused by that country, it does not prevent the naturalizing country
from conferring its nationality on the individual. It does, however,
put the parties on notice of the position of the country of origin.
According to the same suggestion, the adopting country should fur-
ther require the individual, as a condition subsequent, to effectively
229. Schwarzenberger, op. cit. supra note 32, at 152.
230. Jessup, op. cit. supra note 38, at 100-101. See also Wigmore, op. cit. supra note
215, at 769, who would solve this problem by basing citizenship on domicile, and as an
example states that "when an American leaves America and goes to Farland to live he
would equally come under Farland, with all its residents, in citizenship and loyalty and
local duty. So that our state would have no further duty or right to protect him."
231. Panezevys-Saldutiskis Railway, P.C.I.J., See. A. No. 2 (1939) at 16.
232. League of Nations, V. Legal, Acts of the Conference for the Codification of Inter-
national Law, Meetings of the Committees, Vol. II, Minutes of the First Committee 73.
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renounce his old allegiance in the manner prescribed by the laws of the
country of origin. Even if that country considers its former national
expatriated by the very act of naturalization, a report of the fact of
naturalization to the country of origin would serve to clarify the status
of the individual. Should the country of origin refuse to accept the re-
nunciation, the individual is made aware of the risks he may run should
he ever return within the territorial jurisdiction of that country.
To require an expatriation permit might prevent some prospective
citizens from applying for naturalization when that application is made
for reasons of convenience. Often in such cases the individual has no
idea of renouncing his old allegiance, and to require the permission of
his country of origin may have a deterrent effect.
The United States, was, at one time, strongly against the use of
expatriation permits, but that was when America was in need of a large
body of citizens. Now that American citizenship is at a premium and
is becoming increasingly difficult to acquire and easier to lose, it is likely
that this additional condition on naturalization might well be favorably
considered.
The Author's Recommendations
The recommendations to be made by the author are of two kinds,
those applicable to dual nationality in general, and those applicable to
the American citizen of Italian origin. They express the personal views
of the author, and especially with respect to the solution of the general
problem, are based on the assumption that greater and more wide-
spread knowledge of nationality laws will lessen the existing difficul-
ties.
The author is in accord with the prevailing opinion that the eventual
solution to dual nationality lies in the universal adoption of a uniform
rule for the acquisition of nationality at birth and through naturali-
zation. He feels, however, that too much emphasis has been placed on
theory and not enough on the ground-work necessary to bring about
acceptance of the universal rule. For that reason he will limit himself
to recommending what he believes are practical, everyday methods for
the dissemination of information on nationality. This step will attune
the international community and the individual States to the possibility
and desirability of change, and may eventually lead to the desideratum,
i.e., a uniform nationality law. It may also encourage the individual
to participate in collective action to bring about this end.
The recommendations are directed towards three entities, the interna-
tional community, the State, and the individual. A division in that order
will be made in the following presentation of these recommendations, but
it is important for the reader to realize that all three entities are neces-
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sarily involved to some degree in all the recommendations made. The
division is only for the purpose of emphasizing which entity has the
major responsibility for fulfilling the task involved.
It is recommended that a registry of nationality laws be established,
and kept current, by the international community, or by private agen-
cies interested in the development of international law. This would
eliminate some of the confusion that now exists with respect to na-
tionality laws and their authoritative interpretations. Those compila-
tions presently in use are outdated and practically valueless, except
possibly as background material. An up-to-date registry would be a
reliable source of information which would be available to those inter-
ested in the problem, thus enabling them to make concrete and specific
recommendations. Under this recommendation, it would be incumbent
upon the states to cooperate by supplying, as soon as possible, all re-
visions of law, and the newest interpretations thereof, to the central
agency.
First, it is recommended that the States take into account that mat-
ters of nationality are not exclusively within their domestic jurisdiction.
When dual nationality exists, it is a source of conflict between the in-
terests of several States, which may lead to friction and impaired rela-
tions. This necessarily is of concern to the international community.
However, so long as the emphasis is on the domestic nature of nation-
ality, States are likely to remain adamant in asserting their independence
in these matters and in seeking solutions which are beneficial princi-
pally to themselves. Once the emphasis is shifted the States will
likely be more cooperative in their efforts to solve existing difficulties,
and their activities may then be directed towards the interest of the
world community. Thus, should the States be impressed with the fact
that nationality is of international concern, great progress will already
have been made in the solution of the problem of dual nationality.
Second, it is recommended that every effort be made by the State to
compile a nationality census. This normally would be subsequent to
the compilation of the registry of laws indicated above, but need not
be so. Detailed questions would have to be asked, and the answers
would have to be analyzed by experts in the nationality laws of the
several States. It is realized by the author that this may not be feasible,
so it is alternately suggested that at least a careful examination of those
traveling abroad be made. This recommendation would be useful to
point out the difficulties involved at present in determining nationality,
and might result in specific suggestions for amelioration. In addition
to highlighting existing inconsistencies, this would enable State agen-
cies to adequately counsel travelers on their nationality status and ex-
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plain to them the risk that might be incurred by dual nationals in
going to those nationalities that claim them as nationals, as well as to
third nations.
In conjunction with the above recommendation, it is also suggested
that more rigorous attention be paid by the State in selecting personnel
informed on nationality laws for service in State agencies concerned
with citizenship matters. A minimum requirement for employment
would be a knowledge of the conditions and procedure for expatriation
laid down by other countries. This would enable these agencies to
counsel dual nationals on how to divest themselves of an unwanted
nationality.
It is further recommended that information be freely accessible as
to the possible dual nationality status of an individual so that he may
take steps to avoid undesirable consequences. Written brochures may
be used for this purpose, but it is essential that some system be de-
vised not only to bring their contents to the attention of the individual
concerned, but also to ensure that he understands them. This should
be especially emphasized at times when, and places where, citizenship
assumes great importance, i.e., petition for naturalization, application for
a passport, etc.
It is recommended that naturalization agencies require individuals
to possess expatriation permits, or at least evidence of refusal, before
naturalization is granted. The burden of following the procedure in-
volved would be on the prospective citizen. If the permit is received,
nationality is lost, and all concerned are made aware of that fact; if
it is refused, the critical situation is exposed before it has had an ad-
verse effect on the individual and on the relations between the States.
This recommendation would emphasize the disparity in nationality laws,
and would lead to negotiations between the States before harm has
been caused to the individual, or to the relations between the States.
To further lessen the possibility of unpleasant consequences, it is
recommended that the dual national, when he is appraised of his status,
be required to make, and aided in making, an attempt to divest himself
on an unwanted nationality prior to his leaving the territorial jurisdic-
tion of a State of which he is a national for the territorial limits of the
other State of which he is also a national.
If all the above recommendations are followed, it is felt by the
author that there would be substantial amelioration both in the posi-
tion of the dual national and in relations between the States in mat-
ters concerning nationality. Further, once the recommendations are put
into practice, a solid foundation will have been laid on which to build
an equitable universal nationality law which could be adopted in the
municipal legislation of all nations of the world community.
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The American citizen of Italian origin has been the author's main
concern in this thesis. The treatment of recommendations with regard
to the Italo-American will be divided into two parts, one dealing with
the elimination of dual nationality, and the other with amelioration in
specific areas of hardship resulting from his status.
We have seen that Italo-American dual nationality arises at birth
because of the conflict of the principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis, and
subsequent to birth because of the refusal of Italy to recognize the in-
dependent naturalization of a married woman. In either case it is
possible for the individual to elect and thereby divest himself of one
of his nationalities. It is therefore recommended that the Italo-Ameri-
can dual national be compelled, when he comes of age, to take advan-
tage of the expatriatory provisions in the nationality laws of both the
United States and Italy, and further, that he register his choice with
the proper authorities.
Many of the situations which could produce, and in many instances
did produce, friction between the United States and Italy, and hard-
ship on the American citizen of Italian origin have been eliminated.
We have seen that the onerous provision in the Italian citizenship
law regarding the remaining obligation of military service for those
who had lost Italian citizenship is no longer applicable by virtue of the
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United
States and the Italian Republic. This treaty, however, is not applicable
to the dual national, and it is recommended that the Italo-American
dual national, if he wishes to protect himself against military service
in Italy, divest himself of Italian citizenship by express renunciation.
A further recommendation is made to the Italian Government that the
provision with which we are here concerned be repealed. It is an an-
achronism and has in the past been a great source of friction between
Italy and other countries. In the interests of Italy, as well as of the
world community it should be abolished.
The liability of all Italian citizens, former and present, for bearing
arms against the State was settled by the Treaty of Peace between
Italy and the Allied Powers, and the Italo-American who fought against
Italy is thus protected. However, it is recommended that the provision
as to former citizens being considered citizens for the purpose of the
penal law here dealt with be repealed. It, too, is an anachronism and
does not take into consideration the realities of the situation, i.e., the
former Italian citizen, residing elsewhere and a citizen of the place where
he lies, owes a greater allegiance to his present State than he does
to his former one.
In connection with prosecution for treason, it is recommended that
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the United States take a more realistic attitude. The United States
should realize that allegiance to more than one State may be exacted
from a dual national, and, if the latter is in enemy territory, it is not
inconsistent with general conceptions of loyalty for him to aid a
nation of which he is a national against the other nation of which he is
also a national. The treason provision in the United States Code should
be held inapplicable to the dual national. It is sufficient in the situation
here envisioned, for the dual national automatically to lose his American
citizenship, and retribution should not be a part of his punishment. It
is therefore recommended that the section of the Code relating to treason
be amended to specifically exempt dual nationals from its provisions.
Obligations arising from the application of municipal law in civil
matters, and other criminal cases not discussed herein, are not ap-
plicable to the former national who has renounced his nationality of
origin. It is therefore recommended that the dual national divest him-
self of the nationality under whose jurisdiction he does not want to
come. This may be done in accordance with the applicable provisions
of both Italian and American nationality legislation.
In conclusion, it is safe to say that, at present, the problem of dual
nationality causes little friction between the United States and Italy.
If the dual national divests himself of one nationality, and if the treaty
provisions now in effect are made permanent through change in munici-
pal legislation, there will be no need for future concern over the nation-
ality status of the American citizen of Italian origin.
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